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TEXTING WHILE DRIVING MEETS THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: DETERRING BOTH
TEXTING AND WARRANTLESS CELL PHONE
SEARCHES
Adam M. Gershowitz

Recent laws criminalizing texting while driving are under-inclusive, ambiguous,
and impose light punishments that are unlikely to deter. At the same time, the laws
empower police to conduct warrantless searches of drivers’ cell phones. Texting
while driving is dangerous and should be punished with stiff fines, possible jail
time, license suspensions, and interlock devices that prevent use of phones while
driving. However, more severe punishment will not eliminate police authority to
conduct warrantless cell phone searches. This Article therefore proposes that
legislatures allow drivers to immediately confess to texting while driving in
exchange for avoiding a search of their phones. Trading a confession for a search
will encourage guilty pleas while reducing invasive, warrantless cell phone
searches that are currently authorized under the Fourth Amendment.


Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to Brian
Wittpenn and Katherine Witty for helpful research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Texting while driving causes thousands of deaths every year,1 and studies
have shown it to be more dangerous than drunk driving.2 In response, legislatures
in dozens of states have recently imposed restrictions on cell phone use while
driving.3 While the explosion of legislative activity is commendable, most of the
statutes are badly flawed. In their haste to stop texting while driving, some
legislatures have failed to prohibit other dangerous cell phone use, such as e-

1.
See Fernando A. Wilson & Jim P. Stimpson, Trends in Fatalities from
Distracted Driving in the United States, 1999 to 2008, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2213, 2215–
16 (2010) (estimating that texting while driving resulted in more than 16,000 highway
deaths between 2001 and 2007).
2.
See infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
3.
See infra notes 44–52 and accompanying text.
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mailing or using Facebook while driving.4 Other states have set fines so low—for
instance, $20 in Virginia and California5—that texting while driving more closely
resembles a parking ticket than a comparably dangerous activity such as drunk
driving.6
At the same time that states treat texting while driving as a trivial offense,
the existence of these laws gives tremendous power to police officers to conduct
invasive and warrantless searches of drivers’ cell phones. Under the search
incident to arrest doctrine, police are entitled to search everything on a person,
following a lawful arrest, even if the arrest is only for a low-level traffic offense. 7
Over the last few years, dozens of courts have held that cell phones are just like
any other container found on a person and can therefore be searched incident to
arrest without a warrant.8 Accordingly, drivers who have their cell phones on their
person can be arrested for any offense—including texting while driving—and have
the full contents of the phone searched incident to arrest. In fact, even if the cell
phone is in the vehicle, rather than on the driver’s person, police have authority to
search it incident to arrest.9
Even beyond the search incident to arrest doctrine, officers have power
under the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception to conduct warrantless

4.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (2012); see also Alan
Lazerow, Near Impossible to Enforce at Best, Unconstitutional at Worst: The Consequences
of Maryland’s Text Messaging Ban on Drivers, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–6, 29–32 (2010)
(“Assuming, arguendo, it is clear what constitutes a text message, absent a confession or the
confiscation of the cell phone in question, it is difficult for a prosecutor to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a driver was writing or sending a text message, as opposed to
engaging in non-proscribed behavior.” (footnote omitted)).
5.
E.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23123(b) (2012) (“A violation of this section is an
infraction punishable by a base fine of twenty dollars ($20) for a first offense . . . .”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-1078.1(D) (2012) (“A violation of any provision of this section shall
constitute a traffic infraction punishable, for a first offense, by a fine of $20 . . . .”).
6.
For a review of the penalties for first-offense drunk driving, see Adam M.
Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials in Drunk Driving
Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 967–69.
7.
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224–27, 235–36 (1973).
8.
See Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your
Cell Phone From a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1137 n.66 (2011)
(cataloging dozens of cases).
9.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Gant, police are
permitted to search a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe
evidence of the crime of arrest could be found in the vehicle. 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).
This new rule seemingly forbids searches of the vehicle after arrests for low-level traffic
infractions (think of running a stop sign or failing to signal) because there would be no
evidence of the traffic infraction anywhere inside the vehicle. Yet, if a driver is arrested for
texting while driving and his phone is sitting on the front seat of the car, it is reasonable to
believe there is evidence of texting in the phone. And if texting-while-driving statutes are
drafted broadly (as they should be) to prohibit e-mailing, Internet browsing, and other
applications while driving, police would be permitted to search through almost the entire
phone without a warrant.
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searches of phones when texting while driving is suspected.10 If police have
probable cause, they can open any container in an automobile without a warrant.11
Because courts consider cell phones to be electronic containers,12 police can
conduct warrantless searches of cell phones found in vehicles. 13 Under the
automobile exception, police officers do not even need to arrest the driver to
search her phone. In states that have forbidden a wide array of cell phone uses
while driving—for example, texting, e-mailing, Internet browsing, and other
functions—police seemingly have authority to search through the entire contents
of the phone, even if the crime is only a low-level misdemeanor.14
As matters now stand, the cost-benefit analysis behind criminalizing
texting-while-driving statutes is misguided.15 Many texting-while-driving statutes
are under-inclusive and impose penalties that are too lenient to deter dangerous
cell phone use. On the other hand, texting-while-driving statutes have opened the
door to police roaming through reams of private cell phone data to gather evidence
about misdemeanor traffic offenses. To put it differently, most texting-whiledriving statutes authorize a million-dollar search for evidence of a twenty-dollar
crime.
Because texting while driving is dangerous behavior that merits
comprehensive prohibition and stiff penalties, I do not suggest abandoning
criminal penalties for cell phone use while driving. Rather, legislatures should
more comprehensively criminalize and more severely punish texting while driving.
At the same time, statutes should be designed to drastically reduce police officers’
authority to conduct warrantless (and possibly pretextual) searches of cell phones
in the name of proving texting while driving allegations.
To deter dangerous cell phone use, legislatures should treat texting while
driving similar to drunk driving. This means, first of all, increasing fines and

10.
Numerous courts have upheld searches of cell phones under the automobile
exception in other contexts. See infra note 141.
11.
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579 (1991).
12.
See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109–10 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2009) (“I see no
principled basis for distinguishing a warrantless search of a cell phone from the search of
other types of personal containers found on a defendant’s person . . . .”); see also Adam M.
Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 39–40 (2008).
13.
See infra Part III.B.
14.
See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of
Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS.
L.J. 341, 392–93 (2004) (describing how the Supreme Court has created an “Iron Triangle”
of bright-line rules that gives the police “general search power over anyone traveling by
automobile” even for trivial violations).
15.
Because it is easy to see when other drivers are texting and it is natural to
form personal conclusions, the cost-benefit calculus is often not carefully considered. For an
early criticism of cell phone laws in this regard, see Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley,
The Disconnect Between Law and Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Drivers and Cell
Phones, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 168–78 (2003).
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authorizing jail time for the most serious violators.16 Second, individuals convicted
of texting while driving should forfeit their driver’s licenses for a period of time,
just like convicted drunk drivers.17 Third, just as some convicted drunk drivers are
required to install ignition interlocks that prevent them from starting their vehicles
with alcohol on their breath,18 texting while driving offenders should be required
to install one of the many inexpensive products that prevent cell phones from
operating while a vehicle is in motion.19 These tougher drunk-driving style
punishments all make sense in light of the danger posed by texting while driving.
However, tougher punishments alone are not sufficient. Social scientists
have long found that the severity of punishment is less important than certainty of
punishment in deterring undesirable behavior.20 And tougher punishments do not
address the problem of police officers having authority to search enormous
amounts of sensitive cell phone data for a misdemeanor traffic offense.
Accordingly, legislatures should set up a framework in which drivers would have
an incentive to plead guilty more often and more quickly while simultaneously
restricting police officers’ ability to search cell phones. To do that, legislatures
should encourage drivers to provide a confession to the texting while driving
charge in exchange for avoiding a search of the cell phone. Officers would first be
required to give suspects the option to sign a standard written confession
acknowledging that they were texting while driving. Drivers would be informed
that signing the confession would eliminate the officers’ right to search the cell
phone. If, however, the suspect refused to sign the confession, the officer would be
free, if she thought it necessary, to search the cell phone for evidence of texting
while driving.
16.
With the exception of New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, every state in the
nation authorizes jail time—ranging from a few days to more than two years
incarceration—for first-time drunk driving offenders. See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 967–
68.
17.
See, e.g., Chuck Stanfield, Drivers’ License Consequences of a DWI Arrest,
43 HOUS. LAW., Nov./Dec. 2005, at 18, 18 (2005) (discussing Texas’s suspension period of
90 days to one year).
18.
See Gregory T. Neugebauer, Alcohol Ignition Interlocks: Magic Bullet or
Poison Pill, 2 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2, 2 (2002) (noting, almost a decade ago, how 40
states utilized interlock devices for repeat drunk drivers).
19.
For example, one product on the market is “Textecution,” an application that
can be installed for a one-time fee of $29.99, which disables the text message function once
the phone is traveling at more than 10 miles per hour. See How Does It Work?,
TEXTECUTION, http://www.textecution.com/how_does_it_work.php (last visited July 29,
2012). For additional, less-expensive products, see infra notes 196–98 and accompanying
text.
20.
See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND
SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH 47 (1999) (reviewing the
literature and concluding that “there are consistent and significant negative correlations
between likelihood of conviction and crime rates”); Robert Apel & Daniel S. Nagin,
General Deterrence: A Review of Recent Evidence, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 179, 180 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (“There is substantial evidence from a
diverse literature that increases in the certainty of punishment substantially deters criminal
behavior.”); Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 989–93 (reviewing additional literature).
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Exchanging a confession for a search of the cell phone serves two
purposes. First, it will encourage texting while driving defendants to plead guilty
(and to do so faster than they otherwise would) because it will be very difficult to
challenge a written confession at trial. Increasing the certainty and speed of guilty
pleas should improve the deterrent effect of texting-while-driving laws. Second,
encouraging confessions in lieu of cell phone searches will prevent officers from
conducting unnecessary, invasive, and warrantless cell phone searches that could
expose private data unrelated to the texting-while-driving allegation. In short,
legislatures can better deter dangerous activity while simultaneously reducing
warrantless searches of very private information.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the danger posed by texting while
driving to demonstrate the need to criminalize and seriously punish it. Part II then
analyzes the texting-while-driving statutes enacted in recent years and exposes the
flaws in many of these statutes—namely, that they are under-inclusive and impose
punishments that are too lenient. Part III then explores the broad authority police
have to conduct warrantless cell phone searches under the automobile and search
incident to arrest exceptions. Finally, Part IV lays out a framework for enhancing
the certainty, celerity, and severity of texting-while-driving punishments, while
simultaneously reducing the number of warrantless cell phone searches. Part IV
also explains the novelty of exchanging confessions for cell phone searches and
responds to objections that the framework would amount to unconstitutional
coercion.

I. THE DANGERS OF CELL PHONE USE, AND TEXTING IN
PARTICULAR, ARE CONSIDERABLE
A 2003 study by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis attributed 2,600
deaths and more than 330,000 other injuries per year to cell phone use while
driving.21 Those numbers have risen dramatically as cell phones have become
more ubiquitous. By 2005, the California Highway Patrol logged data showing that
cell phones were the top distraction leading to traffic accidents.22 A few years later,
more than a million accidents nationwide per year could be attributed to cell
phones.23 Based on an analysis of traffic fatality data and texting records,
researchers at the University of North Texas recently concluded that texting while
driving was responsible for more than 16,000 deaths between 2001 and 2007.24
And in 2010, the National Safety Council released a study estimating that 1.6

21.
For the study from which the numbers were extrapolated, see Joshua T.
Cohen & John D. Graham, A Revised Economic Analysis of Restrictions on the Use of Cell
Phones While Driving, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 5, 13 (2003); Ashley Halsey III, What Does it
Take to Get Texting off Roads? Consequences Are Only Way, Some Say, WASH. POST, Oct.
5, 2009, at B01.
22.
Marc Benjamin, Drivers Keep Talking in Face of Cell Phone Law, FRESNO
BEE, Oct. 6, 2008, at A1.
23.
Shannon L. Noder, Talking and Texting While Driving: A Look at Regulating
Cell Phone Use Behind the Wheel, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 237, 272 (2009).
24.
See Wilson & Stimpson, supra note 1, at 2215–16.

2012]

TEXTING WHILE DRIVING

583

million crashes per year were due to cell phone use while driving, with texting
while driving accounting for 200,000 of those crashes.25
The connection between cell phone use and traffic accidents is not
surprising. Researchers have found that talking on a cell phone creates a “cognitive
tunnel vision” in which drivers fail to recognize what is happening around them.26
A 2001 study of simulated driving found that college students who were deeply
involved in cell phone conversations missed traffic signals at twice the rate of
those not using phones.27 Research published in The New England Journal of
Medicine found a four-times greater risk of an accident when the driver was using
a cell phone.28
Notably, a number of studies have concluded that hands-free cell phones
are not significantly safer than hand-held phones because the conversation itself is
a major distracter.29 Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University used MRI brain
scans to demonstrate that simply listening to a cell phone conversation while
driving results in a drastic decrease in brain activity focused on driving.30 Based on
this research, it was not surprising that scholars at the University of Utah
concluded that talking on a cell phone is as dangerous as driving drunk.31
Texting while driving is even more dangerous than ordinary cell phone
use because it utilizes cognitive functioning while also requiring the driver to
remove her eyes from the road to see the phone. A car traveling at 65 miles per
25.
Press Release, National Safety Council, National Safety Council Estimates
That at Least 1.6 Million Crashes Each Year Involve Drivers Using Cell Phones and
Texting (Jan. 12, 2010), available at http://www.nsc.org/pages/nscestimates16million
crashescausedbydriversusingcellphonesandtexting.aspx.
26.
Ana M. Alaya, Cell Phone Law Having Trouble Getting Traction—Drivers
Ignore It, While Factions Debate Its Contribution to Safety, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Jan. 2,
2005, at 15 (quoting University of Utah psychology professor David Strayer); see also
Marcel Adam Just et al., Interdependence of Nonoverlapping Cortical Systems in Dual
Cognitive Tasks, 14 NEUROIMAGE 417, 420–21 (2001) (finding that listening to someone
speak uses some of the resources that people otherwise use for visual analysis).
27.
David L. Strayer & William A. Johnston, Driven to Distraction: Dual-Task
Studies of Simulated Driving and Conversing on a Cellular Telephone, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI.
462, 463–64 (2001).
28.
Donald A. Redelmeier & Robert J. Tibshirani, Association Between CellularTelephone Calls and Motor Vehicle Collisions, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 453, 456 (1997).
29.
See Hahn & Dudley, supra note 15, at 156–62 (reviewing early literature).
30.
Annie Barret Wallin, Note, Cell Phones Pose a Distraction to Drivers but
Legislative Ban Is Not the Answer, 98 KY. L.J. 177, 184–85 (2009).
31.
See David L. Strayer et al., A Comparison of the Cell Phone Driver and the
Drunk Driver, 48 J. HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS SOC’Y 381, 388–90 (2006). Professor
Strayer and his colleagues used a driving simulator to compare the dangers posed by cell
phone use and drunk driving. Id. at 383–85. They found that talking on a cell phone slowed
braking reactions and led to more accidents than not using a phone. Id. at 386, 388.
Intoxicated drivers were more dangerous for a different reason: they drove more
aggressively and followed other vehicles at a closer distance. Id. at 387–88. The authors
concluded that “the impairments associated with using a cell phone while driving can be as
profound as those associated with driving with a blood alcohol level at 0.08%.” Id. at 390.
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hour covers 95.3 feet in just one second.32 Studies estimate that texting causes
drivers to look away from the road at least 14 times every 30 seconds to see their
phones.33 A 2009 analysis by Car and Driver magazine found that texting while
driving at 70 miles per hour increased stopping distance by 319 feet for one
participant and resulted in a slower response time than being intoxicated for
another participant.34 It is therefore not surprising that texting while driving
increases the risk of accidents, including a 10% increase in drivers inadvertently
leaving their lanes.35
In the largest study to date, the Virginia Tech Transportation Institute
found even more alarming data based on videotape of millions of miles of actual
driving by truck drivers.36 The study found that talking on a cell phone while
driving marginally increased the risk of crashing but that texting while driving was
23.2 times more dangerous than non-distracted driving.37 The study determined
that drivers who were texting had their eyes off the road for an alarming 4.6 out of
every 6 seconds.38
Polling shows that two-thirds of people under the age of 30 use cell
phones while driving and more than one-third admit to texting while driving.39
And those numbers appear to be on the rise.40 This increase, especially when

32.
Dusty Horwitt, Note, Driving While Distracted: How Should Legislators
Regulate Cell Phone Use Behind the Wheel?, 28 J. LEGIS. 185, 191 (2002).
33.
Robert L. Sachs, Jr., TXT MSGS and Other Driving Distractions, 44 TRIAL,
Feb. 2008, at 20, 22. Another study found that drivers spend up to 400% more time looking
off the road when text messaging while driving. SIMON HOSKING ET AL., MONASH
UNIVERSITY ACCIDENT RESEARCH CENTRE, THE EFFECTS OF TEXT MESSAGING ON YOUNG
NOVICE DRIVER PERFORMANCE 1, 22 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.distraction.gov/
research/PDF-Files/Effects-of-Text-Messaging.pdf.
34.
Michael Austin, Texting While Driving: How Dangerous Is It?, CAR &
DRIVER (June 2009), http://www.caranddriver.com/features/texting-while-driving-howdangerous-is-it.
35.
See Noder, supra note 23, at 247 & n.45 (discussing Clemson University
study). In a study of novice drivers, lane excursions due to text messages rose to 28%. See
HOSKING ET AL., supra note 33, at 21.
36.
New Data from VTTI Provides Insight into Cell Phone Use and Driving
Distraction, VA. TECH. TRANSP. INST. (July 27, 2009), http://opi.mt.gov/pdf/DriverEd/RR/
09VTTI_CellPhonesDistraction.pdf.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
See A Problem of Focus, CONSUMER REP. (Apr. 2011),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/april/cars/distracted-driving/
distracted-driving-awareness/index.htm (finding one-third admit to texting while driving);
Insurance Information Institute, Cellphones and Driving, INS. INFO. INST. (July 2012),
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/cellphones/ (referencing surveys by State
Farm Insurance Company and Public Attitude Monitor finding that between 18% and 32%
of drivers admit to texting while driving); Sachs, supra note 33, at 22 (reporting that AAA
found that 46% of teenagers admitted to texting while driving).
40.
See Study Shows Texting While Driving on the Rise, MOBILE TECH. NEWS
(Apr. 28, 2010), www.mobiletechnews.com/info/2010/04/28/115540.html (noting that
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coupled with the dangers of texting while driving, appears to be a good reason for
legislatures to ban the practice.41

II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES: RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM,
BUT INADEQUATE COVERAGE AND PUNISHMENT
In the aftermath of high-profile accidents and studies documenting the
danger of cell phone use while driving, legislatures have responded with a
vengeance. Over the last decade, every state has considered legislation banning or
significantly restricting cell phone use while driving.42 A handful of states have
banned all hand-held cell phone use (but permitted hands-free use), another group
of states has restricted teenagers from using phones altogether while driving, and
an increasing number of states and municipalities have banned the specific practice
of texting while driving.43 Although legislatures should be applauded for their
initiative, in many instances their statutes are woefully inadequate. Part II.A below
details how many states have failed to restrict other dangerous activity such as emailing or Internet browsing while driving. Part II.B demonstrates that the fines
imposed to punish texting while driving are extremely light in many states.
A. Legislative Action to Date Is Inadequate to Cover the Range of Dangerous
Cell Phone Use
States have responded to the dangerous combination of driving and cell
phone use in a variety of ways. The most aggressive approach—adopted by eight
states and the District of Columbia—has been to ban all hand-held phone use
while driving.44 In these states, drivers are still free to talk on cell phones but only
if they use a hands-free Bluetooth device. The virtue of this approach is that it is a
texting while driving appears to be on the rise 15 months after California banned the
practice).
41.
Of course, the fact that cell phones can be linked to traffic accidents and
fatalities does not in and of itself support a full or partial ban on their use. Under a costbenefit analysis, the lost value from prohibiting cell phone use may not outweigh the deaths,
injuries, and property damage that could be averted. Indeed, some early assessments argued
that a ban would result in a net cost to society of $20 billion annually. Hahn & Dudley,
supra note 15, at 149; Robert W. Hahn et al., Should You Be Allowed to Use Your Cellular
Phone While Driving?, 23 REGULATION 46, 49–50 (2000). Newer research is necessary now
that the injuries, deaths, and property damage attributable to cell phone use has risen
dramatically.
42.
For a general summary of the legislation, see Cell Phone and Texting Laws,
GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone
_laws.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
43.
Id.
44.
Those states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey,
New York, Oregon, Washington, as well as the District of Columbia. See CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 23123(a) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-296aa (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,
§ 4176C (2012); D.C. CODE § 50-1731.04(a) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.1
(2012), amended by 2012 Md. Laws Ch. 251 S.B. No. 529 (effective Oct. 1, 2012); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §39:4-97.3 (2012); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225-c (2012); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 811.507 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.667 (2012).
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straightforward and easily enforceable bright-line rule. Either the driver was using
a hands-free device or she was not. And because drivers are not permitted to use
their hands, texting while driving is clearly prohibited under these statutes.45
More than two-dozen states have adopted more nuanced restrictions on
cell phone use while driving.46 In these states, some cell phone use is permissible
(such as talking on or dialing a phone), while other use (such as texting) is
forbidden. Unfortunately, efforts at nuance often create ambiguities and loopholes
that legislatures likely did not intend.
In attempting to draft nuanced statutes, a number of states have forbidden
any “text-based communication” while a vehicle is in motion.47 Other states have
forbidden drivers from writing, sending, or reading a “written communication,”48
“written message,”49 “electronic message,”50 “electronic communication[],”51 or
“interactive communication”52 while the vehicle is moving.
The difficulty with these statutes is that they do not provide clear
definitions for what a “text-based communication” or similar term includes. Some
states have failed to define the terms “electronic message” or “written message.”53
Other states have defined “written communication” or “text-based
communication” as including but “not limited to a text message, an instant
message, electronic mail, and Internet web sites.”54 This definition is both unduly
narrow and unhelpfully vague. Can a driver use the map function of an iPhone to
read the directions to his destination while he is driving? Would the answer be
“yes” if he only viewed the map (because it is a picture) but “no” if he read “Turn
45.
Although these states have adopted a bright-line rule that is more easily
enforceable, its effectiveness is debatable. Some studies indicate that hands-free phone
usage is just as dangerous as hand-held phones. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying
text.
46.
For an overview of the existing statutes, see GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY
ASS’N, supra note 42.
47.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23123.5, amended by 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 92 (A.B.
1536) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-241.2 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 189.292 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:300.5 (2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11901c (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-237 (2012).
48.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-15,111 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,179.01 (2012).
49.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-199 (2012).
50.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 13B (2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.475
(2012).
51.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2119 (2012), amended by 2012 Me. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 654 (S.P. 684) (L.D. 1912) (effective Jan 1, 2013).
52.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-51-1504 (2012).
53.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 13B; TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8199.
54.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60-6,179.01; see also, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6241.2 (2012) (defining text-based communication as “including but not limited to a text
message, instant message, e-mail, or Internet data”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-22-30
(2012) (defining text message as “including but not limited to, text messages, instant
messages, electronic messages or e-mails, in order to communicate with any person or
device”).
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Right on Main Street” (because that is written in text)? Is looking at Facebook
permissible if the driver uses a phone application to do so rather than looking at an
“Internet website?” Is playing an interactive trivia game through the phone
permissible, or does that somehow fall within the category of “instant message?”
These questions and countless others are not answered by the vague statutory
language and definitions in most states that have criminalized texting while
driving.
Other states have drafted statutes that are more specific but are
troublingly under-inclusive. For example, in Michigan and New Hampshire, the
legislatures have only forbidden texting while driving.55 In Iowa, it is unlawful to
send, read, or write a text message while driving, but a text message includes only
“an instant message and electronic mail.”56 Wisconsin forbids only “composing or
sending an electronic text message or an electronic mail message” but not actually
reading the messages.57 Virginia prohibits drivers only from manually entering
letters or text in a hand-held device, as well as “read[ing] any email or text
message,” but it is seemingly permissible to surf the Internet or look at
photographs or videos. 58 Millions of drivers in these states are free to use their
phones for a range of dangerous activities, such as Internet surfing, checking
Facebook, banking online, or even playing Scrabble without running afoul of
many texting-while-driving statutes. Legislatures surely did not intend for such
large loopholes to exist. 59
In sum, legislatures have made an admirable start in attempting to
criminalize cell phone use while driving, but most statutes are vague and woefully
55.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.602b (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 265:105-a (2012) (explaining that there is no texting while driving violation when a
person “reads, selects, or enters a number or name in a wireless communications device for
the purpose of making a phone call”). The New Hampshire law, which only forbids writing
text messages, also forbids “us[ing] 2 hands to type on or operate an electronic or
telecommunication device.” Id.
56.
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.276 (2012). Similarly, Utah forbids only “text
messaging or electronic mail communication” while driving. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a1716 (2012). In Maryland, the prohibition includes only a “text message or electronic
message.” MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 21-1124.1 (West 2012), amended by 2012 Md. Laws
Ch. 251 (S.B. 529) (effective Oct. 1, 2012).
57.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.89 (2012).
58.
VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1078.1 (2012). Likewise, North Carolina forbids
“manually entering multiple letters or text in the device” as well as reading “any electronic
mail or text message” but not other behavior. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-137.4A (2012).
59.
For example, although Washington’s statute only prohibits using an
electronic wireless communication device to send, read, or write a text message, the statute
goes to the trouble of specifying that a person is not violating the law if “she reads, selects,
or enters a phone number or name in a wireless communications device for the purpose of
making a phone call.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.668 (2012). This language is
completely unnecessary as reading, selecting, or entering a phone number clearly does not
fall under the list of proscribed conduct, and its inclusion likely indicates that the legislature
did not realize how little behavior it had actually prohibited in forbidding texting while
driving.
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under-inclusive. With each passing year, smart phones become capable of a host of
new applications that are not prohibited by many existing statutes. Recently
enacted statutes would have been effective for first- and second-generation cell
phones, which were used in the mid-2000s and were only capable of making phone
calls and short text messages; however, these statutes are inadequate for today’s
phones, many of which come with full Internet capability and endless applications.
B. Punishments Are Far Too Lenient
In addition to being vague and under-inclusive, most texting-whiledriving statutes impose surprisingly light penalties. As described below, most
states treat texting while driving as a traffic infraction, which is typically the
lowest level offense in a state’s criminal code. No jail time is authorized, fines are
very low, and ancillary punishments (such as loss of drivers’ licenses or mandatory
defensive driving classes) are almost nonexistent.
Most of the states that have criminalized texting while driving have set a
fine of $100 or less for first offenders.60 A handful of states have imposed even
lower fines that more closely resemble a parking ticket. Kentucky authorizes a
maximum fine of $25,61 while Iowa limits offenses to a $30 penalty. 62 In
California and Virginia, the fine for texting while driving is only $20. 63 A few
states authorize more serious fines of $125 to $750, but those amounts are usually
not mandatory and judges are free to impose a lesser sum.64

60.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-239 (2012) ($50 fine); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 21, § 4176C (2012) ($50 fine); D.C. CODE §§ 50-1731.04, 1731.06 (2012) ($100 fine);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-15,111, 8-2118 (2012) ($60 fine); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A,
§ 2119 (2012) (not less than $100 fine); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 13B (2012) ($100
fine); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.602b (2012) ($100 fine); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 265:105-a (2012) ($100 fine); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-97.3 (2012) ($100 fine); N.Y. VEH.
& TRAF. LAW § 1225-c (2012) (up to $100 fine); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-137.4A ($100
fine); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 31-22-30 (2012) ($85 fine); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-8-199
(2012) (up to $50 fine); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1099 (2012) ($100 fine); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-5-237 (2012) (up to $75 fine).
61.
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 189.292, 182.990 (2012).
62.
See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 321.276, 805.8A (2012).
63.
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23123.5 (2012), amended by 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch.
92 (A.B. 1536) (effective Jan. 1, 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1078.1.
64.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-296aa (2012) ($125 fine), amended by
2012 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 12-67 (S.B. 61) (effective Oct. 1, 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 406-241.2(d) (2012) ($150 fine); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 9-24-10-8, 34-28-5-4(c) (2012) (up to
$500 fine); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:300.5(c)(1) (2012) (up to $175 fine); MD. CODE ANN.
TRANSP. §§ 21-1124.1, 27-101 (2012) (up to $500); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 169.475, 169.89
(2012) (up to $300 fine); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 304.820, 560.016 (2012) (up to $200 fine and
points on driver’s license, but only for drivers twenty-one and under); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
47, § 11-901c (2012) ($500 fine); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 811.507, 153.018 (2012) (up to $250);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6a-1716, 76-3-301 (2012) (up to $750 fine); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 46.61.668, 46.63.110 (up to $250 fine); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 346.89(3)(a),
346.95(2) (2012) (fine of between $20 and $400).
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These small fines are typically the only punishment for texting while
driving. In almost every state where it is illegal to use a cell phone while driving,
offenders face no possibility of jail time. There are two surprising exceptions,
however. In Utah, texting while driving is a Class C misdemeanor that carries a
possible jail sentence of 90 days. 65 And in Alaska, the crime of viewing a screen
device while driving (which includes televisions and other computer monitors in
addition to cell phones) is a Class A misdemeanor that carries the possibility of a
$10,000 fine and up to a year in jail.66 Yet, even these states almost never impose
any actual incarceration.67
The relatively lax punishments for texting while driving are reminiscent
of the light penalties for drunk driving decades ago.68 With the rise of Mothers
Against Drunk Driving (“MADD”) and its lobbying campaign in the 1980s, the
federal government and states got tougher on drunk driving by authorizing jail
time, imposing stiffer fines, and lengthening license suspensions.69 Today, almost
every state in the nation authorizes jail time for first-time drunk driving
offenders.70 Almost 20 states authorize up to six months in jail, and another dozen
states authorize up to a year or more incarceration for first offenders.71 And while
many first-time offenders are never actually sentenced to any jail time,72 they
almost always pay significant fines following conviction. Most states authorize
fines of around $1,000 (and sometimes drastically more) for first-time drunk
drivers,73 and anecdotal evidence indicates that offenders actually pay significant
sums. For example, in Houston, Texas, the typical fine imposed on a first-time

65.
See UTAH CODE. ANN. § 41-6a-1716(4)(c) (2012) (making it a Class C
misdemeanor); id. § 76-3-301(1)(e) (imposing a fine of up to $750 for Class C
misdemeanor); id. § 76-3-204 (imposing an imprisonment sentence of up to 90 days for
Class C misdemeanor).
66.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.35.161(a)(1), 12.55.035(b)(5), 12.55.135(a) (2012).
67.
See Chris Freiberg, Alaska Texting While Driving Charge Nets Probation,
FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.newsminer.com/view/
full_story/10074022/article-Alaska-texting-while-driving-charge-nets-probation (noting that
defendant, who was texting while driving, received probation after almost hitting a police
officer).
68.
See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care,
Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 1, 67–68 (2002) (explaining that drunk driving prohibitions were “sumptuary
offenses” like “blue laws” and that “[s]ignificant penalties for violating sumptuary laws
were long inconsistent with popular attitudes”).
69.
See JAMES B. J ACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA XVII (1989).
70.
See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 967–68.
71.
For an overview of the punishments authorized in the different states, see id.
72.
See id. at 968.
73.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-5A-191(e) (2012) ($600 to $2,100); CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23536(a) (2012) ($390 to $1,000); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(c)(1)(A) (2012)
($300 to $1,000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 291E-61(b)(1)(C)(3) (2012) ($150 to $1,000); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1) (2012) ($500 to $5,000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-1130(2)(a) (2012) ($250 to $1,000).
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offender is $500 to $1,000.74 In Detroit, fines are even tougher, sometimes
approaching $2,000.75
Drunk drivers also face ancillary penalties that texting while driving
defendants do not. Following drunk driving convictions, most defendants have
their licenses suspended, usually for a period of months.76 Most states have not
even authorized license suspensions for texting while driving, much less imposed
them.77
Additionally, a considerable number of repeat drunk drivers (and even a
small number of first offenders) are required to install alcohol ignition interlocks in
their vehicles following conviction.78 Although there are similar (and far less
expensive) products on the market that can be installed in vehicles or cell phones
to stop texting while driving,79 states do not require any such installations
following texting convictions.
In sum, there is a dramatic difference in the way that states treat the
equally dangerous activities of drunk driving and texting while driving. Drunk
drivers face stiff fines, possible jail time, license suspensions, ignition interlock
devices, as well as the ramifications for employment and university admissions
that come with a criminal conviction.80 Not surprisingly, affluent defendants are
willing to hire expensive lawyers to fight drunk-driving charges.81 And while the
price of a good criminal defense is not a formal punishment authorized by the
state, this expensive process is a de facto punishment.82

74.
Interview with Laura Killinger, Assistant District Attorney, Harris County
District Attorney’s Office, in Hous., Tex. (July 22, 2011).
75.
See John Wisely & L.L. Braiser, Arrest Location Could Determine the
Outcome for a Drunken-Driving Penalty, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 24, 2011),
http://www.robertlarin.com/Free_Press_-_Arrest_location_could_determine_the_outcome_
for_a_drunken-driving_penalty.pdf (reporting fines of almost $2,000 in some Detroit area
courthouses); L.L. Braiser, Lawyer, Fines, Fees in a Drunken-Driving Case Could Be
$10,000, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 24, 2011), http://www.freep.com/article/20110724/
NEWS03/110030003/Lawyer-fines-fees-drunken-driving-case-could-10-000
(explaining
that in addition to a typical fine of $500, drunk drivers pay thousands of dollars to hire an
attorney, post bond, get their vehicles out of impound, as well as court costs and driver
responsibility fees).
76.
See Noder, supra note 23, at 269; see also infra notes 173–77 and
accompanying text.
77.
See infra notes 179–83 and accompanying text.
78.
See infra notes 188–93 and accompanying text.
79.
See infra notes 194–98 and accompanying text.
80.
On the ancillary effects of conviction, see John S. Dzienkowski, Character
and Fitness Inquiries in Law School Admissions, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 921, 923 (2004)
(explaining that a majority of law schools ask applicants character and fitness questions,
including questions about criminal offenses).
81.
See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 978–79.
82.
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 201 (Russell
Sage Found. 1992) (1979).
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By contrast, texting while driving is perceived and treated as an
innocuous event. Only two states even authorize jail time, and those states likely
do not incarcerate anyone unless significant injuries result from the texting while
driving.83 Fines are extremely light in most jurisdictions, and offenders do not risk
loss of their license or the costs and stigma of installing a device to prevent future
texting while driving violations. There are also no collateral consequences for
employment or school admissions. Offenders simply pay their ticket the same way
they would for running a stop sign. And while grassroots groups opposed to
texting while driving are starting to raise awareness of the problem and lobby for
legislation,84 their political power is insignificant in contrast to MADD and other
anti-drunk-driving groups. All told, efforts to combat texting while driving do not
equate to the movement to stop drunk driving.
Tougher responses to texting while driving are likely in the future. But for
the time being, many legislatures have outlawed the practice haphazardly and
without adequate punishment. As explained in Part III below, laws prohibiting
texting while driving give police a green light to conduct invasive cell phone
searches.

III. POLICE AUTHORITY TO SEARCH CELL PHONES FOR EVIDENCE
OF TEXTING WHILE DRIVING
The mere existence of laws criminalizing texting while driving gives
police broad authority to search drivers’ cell phones without a warrant. Even
though most texting-while-driving statutes carry only a small fine, those statutes
authorize warrantless searches under the Fourth Amendment’s search incident to
arrest doctrine and automobile exception. Without having to procure a warrant,
police can search text messages, Internet browsing history, Facebook accounts,
and a wide variety of other data on the phone.
A. The Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine
For decades, police officers have had wide authority to conduct
warrantless searches following the arrest of an individual. Although the Supreme
Court has recently scaled back this doctrine considerably in the automobile
context, the search incident to arrest doctrine continues to give police enormous
power to search cell phones. As discussed below, many states have texting-whiledriving statutes that either intentionally or inadvertently give police power to
search cell phones incident to arrest, even if the crime is only punishable by a
small fine.
1. The Basic Doctrine
Under the so-called search incident to arrest doctrine, police are permitted
to search the arrestee and the area within his immediate grabbing space

83.
84.

See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
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contemporaneously with arrest.85 The rationale for this rule is to prevent the
destruction of evidence and to protect officers from the arrestee using a hidden
weapon against them.86 To make matters simple for officers on the street and to
reduce litigation in court, the Supreme Court has primarily treated the search
incident to arrest doctrine as a bright-line rule.87 Anything on an arrestee can be
opened incident to arrest, even if there is no prospect that the arrestee could
destroy it or grab a weapon from it.88 Thus, in the landmark case of United States
v. Robinson, the Supreme Court upheld the search of a cigarette pack in a jacket
pocket after an individual had been arrested for driving with a revoked license.89
Police had authority to search the cigarette pack even though no evidence of
driving with a revoked license would be found there and even though there was no
realistic prospect of a weapon being contained inside.
Police officers’ broad authority under the search incident to arrest
doctrine has also extended to the passenger compartment (but not the trunk) of
vehicles. More than three decades ago, in New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court
embraced the fiction that the passenger compartment of a vehicle was always
within an arrestee’s immediate grabbing space. 90 And because the Court held that
police could conduct a search incident to arrest following any arrest no matter how
trivial the crime, the Belton decision gave police enormous power to search
vehicles incident to arrest and open any containers found in the passenger
compartment.91 Thus, in Belton, the Court upheld the search of a jacket in the
backseat after the officer arrested the occupants for speeding.92
The Belton doctrine gave police such wide authority to conduct
warrantless searches that critics, including Justice Scalia, began to call for its
revision.93 The Supreme Court responded to that criticism in 2009 with Arizona v.
Gant; the Court scaled back police authority to search vehicles incident to arrest
when there was no reason to believe evidence relating to the arrest would be found
in the vehicle.94 In Gant, the police arrested the defendant for driving with a
suspended license, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of a police car.95
Thereafter, police searched Gant’s vehicle and found a jacket in the backseat that
85.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
86.
Id. at 763.
87.
See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 30–31, 33–35.
88.
See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 394–96 (2001).
89.
414 U.S. 218, 220–24, 236 (1973).
90.
453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981).
91.
See Logan, supra note 88, at 396.
92.
See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455–56, 462.
93.
See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I would therefore limit Belton searches to cases where it is
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.”); James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the Search Incident
to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
1417, 1420.
94.
556 U.S. 332, 343–47 (2009).
95.
Id. at 335.
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contained cocaine.96 Although the search would have been upheld under Belton,
the Court in Gant narrowed Belton’s reach by holding that police can only search a
vehicle incident to arrest if “the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search” or “when it is reasonable
to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”97
The Gant decision eliminated police authority to search vehicles after arrests for
most traffic infractions because police are trained to secure arrestees before
searching98 and because there is no reason to believe evidence of a traffic
infraction could be found in the vehicle.99
In light of the Gant decision, the Supreme Court has now embraced two
different rules for warrantless searches incident to arrest. If police are searching
the body of an arrestee or his immediate grabbing space based on Robinson, they
are free to open any container on the person, even if there is no connection
between the arrest and the evidence that might be found in the container. If,
however, police wish to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to
arrest under Gant, they can only do so if the arrestee is unsecured or if it is
reasonable to believe evidence related to the arrest could be found in the vehicle.
In many instances, the rule for automobiles will give police less authority to
search. Nevertheless, as described below, when states have criminalized texting
while driving and made it an arrestable offense, police will have power under
either Robinson or Gant to search the driver’s cell phone.
2. Can Police Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest for Texting While
Driving Evidence?
With the basic parameters of search incident to arrest law laid out in Part
III.A.1 above, the next question is whether police can search cell phones incident
to arrest for evidence of texting while driving. In many states, the answer is yes.
Courts generally, although not universally, authorize police to search cell phones
incident to arrest.100 And despite imposing light penalties for texting while driving,
many states have made it an arrestable offense, thus allowing police to utilize the
search incident to arrest doctrine.

96.
Id. at 336.
97.
Id. at 343.
98.
See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical
Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 665–66 (surveying law
enforcement agencies and finding that “in general, police officers are taught to handcuff an
arrestee (preferably behind his back) before searching the area around him”).
99.
See Barbara E. Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does It Matter? 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 275, 304–08 (discussing the reach of Gant in changing search incident to arrest
doctrine). Some observers question the practical scope of the Court’s decision because there
are relatively few arrests solely for traffic violations. For an argument that Gant does not
eliminate much police authority to search, see generally Seth W. Stoughton, Note, Modern
Police Practices: Arizona v. Gant’s Illusory Restriction of Vehicle Searches Incident to
Arrest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1727 (2011).
100.
See infra notes 104–08.
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Over the last decade, dozens of courts have grappled with whether it is
permissible for police to search cell phones incident to arrest.101 When police arrest
suspected drug dealers (and likely when they arrest some other individuals as
well), they handcuff the arrestee and remove his cell phone from his pocket.
Because drug transactions are often conducted by text messages, 102 police search
the arrestee’s text messages for evidence.103 The arrestee then moves to suppress
the text messages on the grounds that the Supreme Court has never authorized the
search of a cell phone incident to arrest.
Dozens of courts have rejected arrestees’ motions to suppress evidence
found on their cell phones. These courts have reasoned that the search incident to
arrest doctrine allows police to open all containers on an arrestee and that cell
phones are containers.104 These courts take the position that until the Supreme
Court decides otherwise, cell phones are no different from pockets, wallets, or
cigarette packages that have long been fully searchable, even if the cell phones
hold vastly more private data.105 This rationale has been embraced by five federal
circuit courts,106 the California Supreme Court,107 and dozens of other federal and
state courts.108

101.
See Gershowitz, supra note 8, at 1135–42.
102.
For instance, a buyer might text a dealer, “I need a 50” to request a specific
quantity of drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 254 n.2 (5th Cir. 2007).
103.
See, e.g., United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *4
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (noting that although the court rejected the warrantless search of a
cell phone, a drug enforcement agent testified during a suppression hearing that “it is his
practice to search cell phones for text messages primarily because DEA’s policy allows for
it and because it is common to find text messages that further the investigation”).
104.
See, e.g., Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60.
105.
See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 511 (Ca. 2011) (“[U]nder the United
States Supreme Court’s binding precedent, the warrantless search of defendant’s cell phone
was valid. If, as the dissent asserts, the wisdom of the high court’s decisions must be newly
evaluated in light of modern technology, then that reevaluation must be undertaken by the
high court itself.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
106.
See United States v. Pineda-Areola, No. 09-1105, 2010 WL 1490369, at
*663 (7th Cir. Apr. 6, 2010); United States v. Fuentes, 368 F. App’x 95, 99 (11th Cir.
2010); United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 410–12 (4th Cir. 2009); Silvan W. v. Briggs,
309 F. App’x 216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Young, 278 F. App’x 242, 246
(4th Cir. 2008); Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60.
107.
See Diaz, 244 P.3d at 509–11.
108.
See Gershowitz, supra note 8, at 1135–44 (summarizing case law through
mid-2010). More recently, see United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 711–14 (5th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 191; United States v. Rodriguez, No. C-11-344, 2011 WL
3924958, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2011); United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134,
1140–50 (S.D. Fla. 2011); United States v. Hill, No. CR 10-00261 JSW, 2011 WL 90130, at
*4–8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011); United States v. Grooms, No. 2:10-CR-87, 2011 WL
381036, at *1–2 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2011); United States v. Rodriguez-Gomez, 2010 WL
5524891, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 15, 2010); United States v. Faller, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1028,
1045–46 (E.D. Mo. 2010); United States v. Hodges, No. 09-40077-04-RDR, 2010 WL
2553780, at *5–8 (D. Kan. June 23, 2010); Gracie v. State, No. CR-10-0596, 2011 Ala.
Crim. App. LEXIS 123, at *5–16 (Dec. 16, 2011); People v. Notolli, 199 Cal. App. 4th 531,
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A few courts have refused to uphold the search incident to arrest of cell
phones.109 The rationales supporting these decisions break down into three
categories: (1) cell phones contain so much personal information that they are
categorically different than other containers and cannot be searched incident to
arrest;110 (2) the search of the phone occurred too long after arrest to be
contemporaneous as is required by the search incident to arrest doctrine;111 and (3)
based on the Court’s recent decision in Gant, cell phones should only be searched
incident to arrest when the officer is searching for evidence related to the crime of
arrest.112 These cases are a distinct minority however. 113 Although the Supreme
559 (6th Dist. Sept. 26, 2011); Fawdry v. State, 70 So. 3d 626, 628–30 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2011);
Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 453–62 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2011); Hawkins v. State, 704
S.E.2d 886, 889–92 (Ga. App. 2010); State v. Nix, 237 P.3d 842, 846–53 (Or. Ct. App.
2010).
109.
See United States v. McGhee, No. 8:09CR31, 2009 WL 2424104, at *3–4
(D. Neb. July 21, 2009) (relying on Arizona v. Gant and concluding that search incident to
arrest of cell phone was unjustified because no evidence related to the crime of arrest—
which occurred in early 2008—could be found in the phone when the arrest occurred in
2009); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299–1301 (M.D. Fla. 2009)
(rejecting search incident to arrest of cell phone photos because defendant was arrested for
driving with a suspended license and no information of that crime could be found on a cell
phone); United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 22, 2008) (finding that search was not contemporaneous and was not justified by
exigent circumstances or inventory exception); United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI,
2007 WL 1521573, at *5–12 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (rejecting search incident to arrest
conducted at station because cell phones are possessions within arrestees’ immediate control
and cannot be searched at the station); United States v. LaSalle, No. 07-00032 SOM, 2007
WL 1390820, at *6–8 (D. Haw. May 9, 2007) (finding that search was not
contemporaneous); Commonwealth v. Diaz, No. ESCR 2009-0000, 2009 WL 2963693, at
*6–9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2009) (rejecting search incident to arrest of cell phone
because it occurred more than 20 minutes after arrest and was therefore not
contemporaneous); State v. Novicky, No. A07-0170, 2008 WL 1747805, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2008) (rejecting argument that search of cell phone held in evidence since
initial arrest could fall under search incident to arrest exception when search was conducted
on the day of trial); State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954–55 (Ohio 2009) (holding that cell
phones are not containers that can be searched incident to arrest). Two other courts have
suggested, although not held, that searches of cell phones incident to arrest should be
impermissible without deciding the issue. See United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP,
2008 WL 1925032, at *9, *10 n.4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (noting in dicta, and without
analysis, that even though search of cell phone was proper under a warrant, the district
judge disagreed with the magistrate’s conclusion that the search was also justified under the
search incident to arrest doctrine); United States v. Carroll, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1299
(N.D. Ga. 2008) (expressing skepticism of search incident to arrest of a Blackberry when a
suspect surrendered at the police station, but ordering further briefing before deciding the
issue).
110.
For the most prominent decision, see Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954.
111.
See Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *5–12.
112.
See McGhee, 2009 WL 2424104, at *3–4 (relying on Arizona v. Gant and
concluding that search incident to arrest of cell phone was unjustified because no evidence
related to the crime of arrest—which occurred in early 2008—could be found in the phone
when the arrest occurred in 2009); Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 1291, 1299–1301 (rejecting
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Court has not weighed in on the issue of searching cell phones incident to arrest,114
the trend is strongly toward upholding such searches, with well over two-thirds of
courts reaching that conclusion.115
Because most courts have issued blanket decisions upholding warrantless
searches of cell phones found on an arrestee’s person, there is no reason to think
these courts would rule any differently when the arrest was for texting while
driving rather than a drug offense. The crime for which a person has been
arrested—whether it is drug dealing, arson, or texting while driving—is irrelevant
to the question of whether police can search a cell phone found on an arrestee’s
person.116 The search incident to arrest doctrine is a bright-line rule that allows
police to open all containers on an arrestee, even if there is no reason to believe
either that a weapon could be stored in it or that evidence related to the arrest could
be found there. As long as courts treat cell phones like any other container, and
most courts do,117 then cell phones on an arrestee can be searched following a
texting while driving arrest.
The law becomes slightly more complicated when the container to be
searched is located in the passenger compartment of a vehicle, rather than on the
person of the arrestee. As noted, the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant limited
searches of the passenger compartment of vehicles to instances where the arrestee
is unsecured or the officer has reason to believe evidence related to the crime of
arrest could be found in the vehicle.118 Under the latter rule, courts can often reject
searches incident to arrest in traffic cases—for instance, speeding, running a stop

search incident to arrest of cell phone photos because defendant was arrested for driving
with a suspended license and no information of that crime could be found on a cell phone);
see also United States v. McCray, No. CR408-231, 2009 WL 29607, at *4, n.4 (S.D. Ga.
Jan. 5, 2009) (upholding limited search of cell phone following arrest for statutory rape but
noting that “this case, therefore, does not present the question of whether a cell phone (a
kind of computer capable of storing vast amounts of data) may be subjected to a
comprehensive search incident to a defendant’s arrest for a simple traffic violation”).
113.
Compare supra notes 109–12 (cataloging less than a dozen cases rejecting
the search incident to arrest of cell phones), with supra notes 104–08 (identifying
approximately twice as many cases upholding such searches).
114.
The Court did request further briefing in the Ohio Supreme Court case. See
Docket Files, U.S. SUP. CT., http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/
docketfiles/09-1377.htm (last visited July 14, 2012). Ultimately, the Court declined to grant
certiorari. Ohio v. Smith, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010).
115.
See supra notes 104–12.
116.
See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 34. For a compelling argument that courts
should reverse course and consider crime severity in determining the reasonableness of
searches, particularly in cases of evolving technology, see generally Jeffrey Bellin, CrimeSeverity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a
Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2011).
117.
See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
118.
See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
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sign, or reckless driving—because no evidence of those crimes could possibly be
found in the vehicle.119
However, when the arrest is for texting while driving, Gant provides no
roadblock to searching a cell phone found in the passenger compartment of the
vehicle. Following an arrest for texting while driving, officers could expect to find
evidence in the phone of incomplete texts that the driver had been typing or timestamped messages that the driver had recently sent while driving. Indeed, it is hard
to think of a case where an officer would not expect to find evidence of texting on
the phone following an arrest for that crime. Thus, unlike most traffic offenses, it
would be reasonable for the officer to believe there would be evidence of texting
while driving in the vehicle. As such, if the phone is located in the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, police should be able to search it incident to arrest.
The only real obstacle to police utilizing the search incident to arrest
doctrine when they pull over a driver for texting while driving is that the police
must actually conduct an arrest. The Supreme Court has made clear that police
cannot issue a traffic ticket and “search incident to citation.”120 Thus, texting while
driving must be an arrestable offense and police officers must actually arrest the
driver to conduct the search incident to arrest.
Some states have classified texting while driving as a secondary offense
for which police cannot conduct an arrest and a subsequent search.121 In a few
states, texting while driving is a primary offense, but police lack authority to
conduct a full-custody arrest for traffic offenses, thus precluding a search incident
to arrest.122 In these states, a search incident to arrest would seemingly be off
limits, but even those protections are illusory.
The Supreme Court has recently held that violating state statutes
governing which offenses are arrestable does not constitute a Fourth Amendment
violation that can result in the exclusion of evidence. In Virginia v. Moore, officers
stopped Moore for driving on a suspended license.123 Even though Virginia law did
not allow officers to arrest for that offense, the officers arrested Moore anyway,
and they discovered cocaine when they performed a search incident to arrest.124
119.
See, e.g., United States v. Holland, No. H-09-512, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5261, at *36 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2011) (rejecting search incident to arrest of vehicle
following arrest for failure to signal).
120.
See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118–19 (1998).
121.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.276(5)(a) (2012) (“A peace officer shall
not stop or detain a person solely for a suspected violation of this section. This section is
enforceable by a peace officer only as a secondary action when the driver of a motor vehicle
has been stopped or detained for a suspected violation of another [violation].”); MD. CODE
ANN., TRANSP. § 21-1124.2(e) (2012) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6,179.01(4) (2012)
(same); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1078.1(C) (2012) (same).
122.
See Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and
the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 152 nn.63–64 (1996) (surveying the
law on arrestable offenses and noting that officers have “unfettered discretion [to arrest for
traffic offenses] in twenty-six states and subject to minimal constraints in sixteen states”).
123.
553 U.S. 164, 166–67 (2008).
124.
Id.
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Although acknowledging that the arrest and search were unlawful, the Virginia
trial court refused to suppress the cocaine because Virginia law does not require
the suppression of illegally seized evidence. 125 The Supreme Court of the United
States affirmed the decision on the grounds that a violation of Virginia state law
does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression of
evidence.126 The cocaine was admissible because there was nothing
unconstitutional about arresting Moore for the low-level offense of driving with a
revoked license and searching incident to that arrest.127
Other states have adopted the same approach as Virginia and refused to
suppress evidence that was procured in violation of a state statutory guarantee. For
instance, when local police officers violated a New Jersey statute by making a
warrantless arrest of a defendant outside of their territorial jurisdiction, the court
refused to suppress the resulting evidence because the New Jersey exclusionary
rule applies only to constitutional violations, not statutory violations. 128 Maryland,
Ohio, and other jurisdictions have taken the same approach.129 Thus, even when
legislatures do not make texting while driving an arrestable offense, evidence
found during a search of the driver’s cell phone incident to arrest will not
necessarily be suppressed because the police action amounts to only a statutory
violation, not a constitutional prohibition.
In sum, in most states that criminalize either all hand-held cell phone use
or just texting while driving, police will have authority to search the phone
incident to arrest. Whether the phone is found on the person of the arrestee or
somewhere inside the passenger compartment of the car is significant only in
defining the scope of the search. If officers find the phone on the driver’s person,
then they may conduct a complete search of the entire contents of the phone. This
means police can search not only text messages, but also e-mails, voicemails,
photos, Internet browsing history, calendar entries, and everything else found on
the phone. If officers find the phone in the passenger compartment of the vehicle,
then under Gant, they will be limited to searching for evidence related to the crime
of arrest. In a state that only criminalizes texting while driving, this will limit the
search to the phone’s text messages. But for states with broader statutes that
criminalize the use of texting, e-mail, Internet browsing, and other applications,
police will have authority to search a considerable amount of applications and data
125.
Id. at 167–68.
126.
See id. at 171–73.
127.
See id. at 177–78.
128.
See State v. Gadsden, 697 A.2d 187, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
129.
See id. at 193 (noting that “[t]he trend of many states is to follow
Pennsylvania and hold that where a police officer violates a criminal-procedure statute, such
as exceeding territorial jurisdiction, evidence gathered as a result is not automatically
subject to suppression” and citing cases from a dozen different jurisdictions); see also
Howell v. State, 483 A.2d 780, 781 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (refusing to exclude
evidence or violations of “sub-constitutional” rules); City of Kettering v. Hollen, 416
N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ohio 1980) (“It is clear . . . that the exclusionary rule will not ordinarily
be applied to evidence which is the product of police conduct violative of state law but not
violative of constitutional rights.”).
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on the phone. Put simply, in most situations, the search incident to arrest doctrine
gives police authority to rummage through most of the data on an arrestee’s cell
phone.
B. Police Can Also Search Phones for Evidence of Texting While Driving Under
the Automobile Exception
Although the search incident to arrest exception has received the bulk of
academic attention with respect to cell phone searches, police have wide authority
to conduct warrantless searches under the automobile exception as well. For states
that have not made texting while driving an arrestable offense, or in cases where
police do not want to take the time to effectuate a custodial arrest, the automobile
exception provides an easy way for police to conduct a warrantless search for
evidence of texting while driving. The fact that texting while driving is a low-level
traffic offense will not limit police authority to search.
Almost since the introduction of the automobile, the Supreme Court has
recognized the authority of police to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles. 130
The rationale is twofold. First, automobiles are mobile and warrantless searches
are necessary to locate evidence before the driver leaves the scene and hides or
destroys the evidence.131 Second, because automobiles are utilized on public roads,
they carry a significantly lower expectation of privacy than homes and are thus
entitled to less constitutional protection.132
Unlike the search incident to arrest doctrine, which is automatic following
a lawful arrest, the automobile exception is premised on the police having probable
cause.133 The automobile exception eliminates only the police officer’s obligation
to procure a warrant, not the requirement that she have sufficient suspicion of
criminal activity. Additionally, police can only search the locations in the vehicle
where they have probable cause to believe the evidence is located. As a result,
police do not have blanket authority to search entire vehicles, even if they have
probable cause to be looking for evidence. Police officers who suspect a vehicle
has a stolen flat-screen television cannot search the glove compartment because
the television could not fit there. But officers with probable cause to believe drugs
are in the car can likely search the entire vehicle because drugs can fit anywhere.134
Importantly, for purposes of texting-while-driving laws, the Court has
also allowed warrantless searches when police have probable cause only for a
particular container in a vehicle. Thus, if police have probable cause to believe a
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–62 (1925).
See id. at 153.
See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–95 (1985).
See 1 J OSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 13.01(D) (4th ed. 2006).
134.
This presumes that the officers are not aware of information that the drugs
would only be located in a particular part of the vehicle. For instance, if probable cause is
based exclusively on an informant’s tip, and the informant stated that the drugs were in the
trunk of the vehicle, police would lack probable cause to search the glove compartment. See
id.
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bag contains drugs, and they see the bag being placed into a vehicle, the officers
may stop the vehicle and conduct a warrantless search of the bag itself.135 The fact
that the probable cause is for the bag, rather than the vehicle itself, is irrelevant.
When prosecutors and defense attorneys disagree about whether the
automobile exception is applicable, there are typically two key issues in dispute.
First, did the officer have enough suspicion to amount to probable cause? If the
answer to that question is yes, then the second question becomes: Where in the
automobile and the containers inside of it does the officer have grounds to search?
In cases involving texting while driving, the answer to the first question will
almost always be “yes” and the answer to the second question will be “it depends
on the statute.”
The question of whether the officer has probable cause to search the
phone for evidence of texting while driving is quite easy. When an officer stops a
driver for texting, it is almost always because the officer saw the driver texting.
This personal observation is surely sufficient to create probable cause. 136
Moreover, even if it turns out that the officer was wrong—for instance the driver
appeared to be texting, but he was actually just looking down at printed directions
or picking up a piece of food—that does not eliminate probable cause
retroactively. 137 Indeed, if the officer thinks she saw the driver texting and the
driver adamantly denies it, the officer would still have probable cause (assuming
she had a good view of the driver) because suspects regularly lie to law
enforcement to avoid criminal liability. 138 Because probable cause is a relatively
low standard in this context, the officer’s belief that she saw texting while driving
would, by itself, satisfy the standard. Moreover, if there is probable cause that the
driver was texting while driving, then there is probable cause to believe there will
be incompletely drafted or recently sent text messages on the phone itself. Put
simply, the case for probable cause to believe the phone contains evidence of
texting while driving is ironclad.

135.
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573–81 (1991). Before Acevedo,
the Court took the opposite position. For an overview of the prior caselaw, see WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE : INVESTIGATION § 2.7(c) (2d ed. 2009).
136.
See David A. Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice:
The Significance of Data Collection, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 91 (2003)
(“According to the U.S. Supreme Court, observation of any traffic offense by a police
officer constitutes full and sufficient probable cause for the officer to stop and detain the
driver long enough to perform the actions necessary to issue a citation.”).
137.
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A
policeman’s mistaken belief of fact can properly contribute to a probable cause
determination and can count just as much as a correct belief as long as the mistaken belief
was reasonable in the light of all the circumstances.”).
138.
See Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88
IOWA L. REV. 421, 426–27 (2003) (“Roughly 46% of questioned suspects deny guilt, almost
four times as many as remain silent. Unless the police are formally interrogating huge
numbers of innocent suspects, one must conclude that guilty suspects prefer lies to
silence.”).
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The rest of the analysis follows easily. Courts, almost universally, have
construed cell phones to be containers that can hold evidence. 139 And because the
cell phone was in the automobile at the time of the traffic stop, it is a container that
can be searched without a warrant under the automobile exception.140 At present,
there are already a few cases, primarily involving drug activity, that have adopted
this strain of logic and upheld cell phone searches under the automobile
exception.141
Although there are no reported decisions of courts upholding such
searches for texting while driving prosecutions, it is likely that prosecutors have
already relied on this reasoning. At present, the stakes are so low—$20 fines in
some places142—that most defendants probably just pay the fine without pushing
139.
The container question has typically arisen in the search incident to arrest
context, but the issue would apply in exactly the same way under the automobile exception.
For authority concluding that cell phones are containers, see supra notes 104–08 and
accompanying text. For a prominent decision rejecting the container rationale, see State v.
Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 952–55 (Ohio 2009).
140.
See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 565 (“Police, in a search extending only to a
container within an automobile, may search the container without a warrant where they
have probable cause to believe that it holds contraband or evidence.”).
141.
See United States v. Cole, No. 1:09-CR-0412-ODE-RGV, 2010 WL
3210963, at *18 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2010) (“[T]he seizure of multiple cell phones, in
combination with the seizure of suspected marijuana, firearms, and a large sum of cash
discovered in a shoe box, would together warrant a ‘man of reasonable caution’ to believe
that the contacts and recent calls located on Defendant’s personal cell phone might contain
some additional evidence of illegal drug distribution activity.”); United States v. GarciaAleman, No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010 WL 2635071, at *12 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2010) (finding
probable cause based on drug dog alert to a car where the driver had previously been
arrested with a hidden compartment containing cocaine and because “cell phones have been
held by other circuits to constitute tools of the drug trade”); United States v. Monson-Perez,
No. 4:09CR623 HEA, 2010 WL 889833, at *6–8 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 2010) (concluding there
was probable cause to search a cell phone and allowing a warrantless search under the
automobile exception); United States v. Rocha, No. 06-40057-01-RDR, 2008 WL 4498950,
at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2008) (finding probable cause to search cell phone for drug activity
and relying on automobile exception); United States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008
WL 1925032, at *4, *7. (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008) (upholding search of cell phone’s call log
based on automobile exception); United States v. Fierros-Alvarez, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1206,
1211–14 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 2008) (upholding search of cell phone located in vehicle under
the automobile exception because inventory of vehicle turned up drugs and there was
probable cause to believe the cell phone had facilitated drug transactions); People v. Chho,
No. H034693, 2010 WL 1952659, at *5–6 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. May 17, 2010) (upholding
search of text messages on repeatedly ringing cell phone under automobile exception); State
v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1089–90 (Conn. 2010) (upholding search of cell phone under
automobile exception); State v. Novicky, No. A07-0170, 2008 WL 1747805, at *4, 6–7
(Minn. App. Apr. 15, 2008) (upholding search of cell phone seized from an automobile
when search was conducted on the day of trial). But cf. United States v. Davis, 787 F. Supp.
2d 1165, 1171 (D. Or. 2011) (recognizing that “[c]ell phones may be searched for call
records and other data pursuant to the automobile exception” but rejecting the argument in
this case).
142.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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for an appellate decision on the issue. But as the punishments for texting while
driving get tougher, courts will likely be forced to consider the issue, and it seems
clear that warrantless searches for evidence of texting while driving should be
found permissible under the automobile exception.
The hard question is therefore not whether there is probable cause to
search the phone, but instead where in the phone the officer can search. Are
officers limited to searching text messages, or can they go further and look through
e-mails, Facebook, Internet browsing history, pictures, and various other items?
Here, the answer is trickier and depends on the scope of the statute.
As detailed in Part II above, a few states have banned the use of all handheld cell phones while driving. Under these statutes, an officer who observes a
driver using the phone seemingly has free reign to search any function on the
phone for evidence that it was in use while the vehicle was moving. This includes
text messages, e-mails, Internet browsing history, Facebook accounts, and a host
of other applications. If police come across evidence of other criminal activity in
the course of their search—for instance, text messages about drug transactions or
pictures of child pornography—they are free to seize that evidence.143
Other states have authorized some hand-held cell phone use but forbidden
a large and ambiguous number of functions. For instance, Georgia forbids drivers
from writing, sending, or reading text messages, instant messages, email, or
Internet data.144 Police searching under the automobile exception for a violation of
that statute can therefore look through a phone’s text messages, e-mail accounts,
and Web browser because any indication that those functions were in use while the
vehicle was moving would be evidence of a criminal violation. By contrast, police
cannot search the phone’s photo library, voicemail messages, or calendar entries
because the statute does not prohibit a driver from using those functions while the
vehicle is moving and thus no evidence of a criminal violation could be found
there. For other applications, police authority to search is not clear because
Georgia has not provided a definition of what constitutes an “instant message” or
“Internet data.”145
A few states have (perhaps unintentionally) defined their texting-whiledriving statutes narrowly. For instance, Michigan only forbids text messaging, but
not other functions such as e-mail or Internet browsing.146 In these states, law
enforcement officers, acting under the automobile exception, can only search text
messages.

143.
Police are permitted to seize any item in plain view that is immediately
incriminating. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 128–29 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321, 326–29 (1987).
144.
GA. CODE. ANN. § 40-6-241.2(b) (2012).
145.
See id.
146.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.602b (2012); see also supra notes 55–59
and accompanying text for additional states falling into or close to this category.
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Finally, there are three states that have statutorily forbidden police from
searching or seizing phones as part of a texting while driving investigation.147 For
instance, Indiana’s statute specifies that “[a] police officer may not confiscate a
telecommunications device for the purpose of determining compliance with [the
texting-while-driving statute].”148 Although there is no legislative history
indicating why these provisions were included in the texting-while-driving
statutes, the likely explanation is that legislators wanted to protect the privacy of
offenders and prevent fishing expeditions by law enforcement.149
If true, these privacy concerns are admirable, but the solution is
misguided. Texting while driving is a dangerous offense. Completely eliminating
law enforcement’s ability to collect evidence that someone committed the crime is
therefore not productive. Legislatures do not handicap police in drunk driving
investigations by preventing them from searching cars for beer cans or conducting
field sobriety tests simply because they might also discover other embarrassing
information. To be sure, there are obvious cost-benefit questions that must be
addressed in allowing cell phone searches to prove texting while driving
allegations. However, as described in Part IV.D below, there is a better way to
balance those cost-benefit considerations that encourages convictions for texting
while driving, while preventing many unnecessary cell phone searches.

IV. A COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO TEXTING
WHILE DRIVING THAT MINIMIZES WARRANTLESS CELL PHONE
SEARCHES
Although many states have admirably criminalized texting while driving,
their efforts are insufficient. As described in Part II.B above, drivers in almost
every state can text while driving without worrying about jail time, loss of their
licenses, or large monetary fines. Yet, despite the seemingly inconsequential
punishments imposed for texting while driving, police retain broad authority to
rummage through reams of data on the phones of drivers stopped for texting while
driving. This disconnect makes little sense. Legislatures should therefore take
straightforward steps to enhance the punishment and deterrence of texting while
driving, while simultaneously scaling back police authority to conduct unnecessary
cell phone searches.
147.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-296aa(b)(3) (2012) (“The provisions of this
subsection shall not be construed as authorizing the seizure or forfeiture of a hand-held
mobile telephone or a mobile electronic device, unless otherwise provided by law.”); IND.
CODE § 9-21-8-59(b) (2012) (“A police officer may not confiscate a telecommunications
device for the purpose of determining compliance with this section or confiscate a
telecommunications device and retain it as evidence pending trial for a violation of this
section.”); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225-c(2)(c) (2012) (“The provisions of this section
shall not be construed as authorizing the seizure or forfeiture of a mobile telephone, unless
otherwise provided by law.”).
148.
IND. CODE ANN. § 9-21-8-59(b).
149.
See Jon Seidel, Texting Ban Clears Indiana House Panel, POST-TRIB., Jan.
20, 2011, (News-Metro), at 6 (noting that the Indiana bill prohibits “police from
confiscating a phone in a nod to privacy concerns”).
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A. Legislatures Should Increase Punishments for Texting While Driving
The case for tougher punishments for texting while driving is easily made
by looking to the comparable crime of drunk driving. Although texting while
driving and drunk driving are comparably dangerous activities (with texting
possibly being more dangerous),150 drunk driving is punished far more severely. A
look at the history and current approach to drunk driving helps to put the issue in
perspective.
For decades, the United States treated drunk driving like any other traffic
offense.151 The public did not see drunk driving as a serious criminal offense,
therefore, legislatures punished it extremely lightly. 152 Over time, however, public
attitudes changed. MADD and similar organizations began lobbying legislatures
for tougher penalties in the early 1980s.153 And legislatures eventually increased
penalties for drunk driving because of public pressure. Today most state statutes
authorize the possibility of jail time for first-time offenders.154
The prohibition on texting while driving is at the same place drunk
driving was in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While technically illegal, texting
while driving is not stigmatic because public opinion does not harshly condemn it.
At present, texting while driving is treated more like overtime parking, which is
illegal but not repugnant, than drunk driving, which is both illegal and stigmatic.
Public perceptions about texting while driving will likely change though.
Each year, thousands of new accidents and many deaths are attributed to texting
while driving.155 Some of those cases will become media sensations. For instance,
the public was briefly outraged in 2008 after it was discovered that the engineer
who caused a train crash killing 25 people in California had sent a text message
just seconds before colliding with a freight train.156 As texting while driving
continues to cause mass casualty events—the deaths of high-profile figures, or the
deaths of attractive young people157—public attitudes may slowly begin to
change.158

150.
See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
151.
See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 966–67.
152.
See supra note 68.
153.
See GERALD D. ROBIN, WAGING THE BATTLE AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING:
ISSUES COUNTERMEASURES, AND EFFECTIVENESS 8–14 (1991).
154.
See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 967–68. Authorized punishments
nevertheless remain relatively light, with most states authorizing up to six months
incarceration and, practically speaking, very few courts imposing actual jail time for first
offenses. See id. at 968–69; see also Wisely & Braiser, supra note 75 (explaining that actual
jail time for first-offense drunk drivers in the Detroit area is rare, but one court does
regularly impose it).
155.
See supra notes 24–25.
156.
See Steve Hymon & Molly Hennessy-Fiske, No Drugs, Alcohol Found in
Body of Engineer, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at B3.
157.
See Charles Bassett, Couple Promotes Texting While Driving Safety Device
After Losing Daughter in Crash, NEWSON6.COM (Apr. 22, 2010, 11:42 AM),
http://www.newson6.com/global/story.asp?s=12357878 (“A Texas couple who lost their
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Grass roots organizations are beginning to pop up and lobby against
texting while driving in a way similar to MADD’s attack on drunk driving. 159 It is
quite possible that public attitudes toward texting while driving will eventually
resemble the current perception of drunk driving. The question is whether it will
take decades for the perceptions and punishment levels to change or whether the
transformation will be faster. If legislatures wish to be ahead of the curve, they
should move toward punishment levels that more closely approximate the penalties
for driving while intoxicated.160
As described in Part II.B above, many states currently treat first-offense
drunk driving as a jailable offense punishable by up to six months of
incarceration.161 Some states authorize lighter sentences such as a month or less in
jail, while defendants in other states face penalties of a year or more.162 By and
large, however, states take a fairly consistent approach to drunk driving by
classifying it as more serious than a traffic ticket but less serious than a felony.
Moreover, states authorize jail time and stiff fines for drunk drivers who never
caused an accident.163 This tells us that legislatures have chosen to punish drunk
driving not simply when it causes harm, but more widely in order to deter the
dangerous behavior.
If the basis for punishing drunk driving is that it is dangerous behavior,
then the obvious question is why other similarly dangerous behavior behind the
wheel is not punished in a similar fashion. As discussed in Part II, studies suggest
that texting while driving may be as dangerous or possibly even more risky than

daughter in an accident is in Oklahoma City promoting a new device to help prevent teens
from texting while driving.”).
158.
See Matt Richtel, Utah Gets Tough with Texting Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/29/technology/29distracted.html?pagewanted
=all (explaining that Utah authorized tough punishments, including incarceration, for
texting while driving after two scientists were killed by a college student who crossed into
the other side of the road because he was texting).
159.
For example, a Florida organization called Text Free Driving Organization
describes itself as “a group of concerned citizens who want to make our highways,
roadways and neighborhood streets as safe as possible.” See Purpose, TEXT FREE DRIVING
ORG., http://www.textfreedriving.org/index.html (last visited July 4, 2012).
160.
See A. Starkey De Soto, Intextication: Txting Whl Drvng. Does the
Punishment Fit the Crime?, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 359, 381–90 (2010) (noting, as this Article
does, that because the dangers of texting while driving are similar to the dangers of driving
while intoxicated, legislatures should craft similar penalties).
161.
See Gershowitz, supra note 6, at 967–68.
162.
See id.
163.
Some states draw no distinction between drunk drivers who are arrested
before causing any harm and drunk drivers who cause property damage or modest injuries.
These states do, however, punish intoxicated manslaughter cases (where death results) and
intoxication assault cases (where serious bodily injury results) more severely. Compare
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (2012) (ordinary drunk driving is a Class B misdemeanor),
with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08 (intoxication manslaughter is a second-degree felony),
and TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.07 (intoxication assault is a third-degree felony).
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driving while intoxicated.164 If legislatures are seeking to punish people for risky
behavior and to deter it in the future, it stands to reason that the comparably
dangerous activity of texting while driving should be punished similarly to the
crime of drunk driving. Accordingly, states should authorize jail time for texting
while driving. At present, 48 states authorize jail time for drivers who are
convicted of ordinary drunk driving for the first time,165 but only two states—
Alaska and Utah—do the same for those convicted of texting while driving for the
first time.166
In addition to authorizing jail time, legislatures must also increase the
fines for texting while driving. As noted above in Part II.B, most texting-whiledriving statutes impose very light fines of $100 or less. 167 In some states, the fine
for texting while driving is actually less than the most minor traffic offenses. For
instance, in Kentucky, the first-time fine for texting while driving is only $25,
compared with a $30 fine for speeding at 45 miles per hour in a 30-miles-per-hour
zone.168 In Virginia, exceeding the speed limit in some geographic areas results in
a $200 fine, compared with a $25 fine for the first texting-while-driving offense.169
Even in states that authorize tougher fines for texting while driving, those
amounts are not mandatory and prosecutors and judges likely assess lower
amounts.170 By contrast, first-time drunk drivers around the country face thousands
of dollars in fines, and prosecutors and judges regularly demand payments of $500
to $1,000 or more following conviction.171
Legislatures seeking to send a message about texting while driving and
enhance deterrence should authorize jail time and increase the fines for texting
while driving to bring them in line with the punishments for drunk driving.172

164.
See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text.
165.
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania are the two exceptions. See N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 265-A:18 (2012); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3804(a)(1), (c)(1) (2012) (although
authorizing 72 hours incarceration if offender refused to take breathalyzer test).
166.
See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
167.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
168.
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 189.394, 189.990(30)(b) (2012).
169.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-878.2, -1078.1(D) (2012).
170.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
171.
See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
172.
Deterrence is a notoriously difficult concept to measure. Nevertheless, early
indications are that tougher punishments and more rigorous enforcement, coupled with a
strong public relations campaign, can reduce texting while driving. See Ashley Halsey III,
Fines Lower Drivers’ Use of Cellphones, WASH. POST (July 10, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/fines-lower-drivers-use-of-cellphones/2011/07/08/
gIQAMvX67H_story.html (finding considerable decrease in hand-held cell phone use and
texting based on federal pilot program in Syracuse, New York).
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B. Legislatures Should Revoke the Licenses of Drivers Convicted of Texting
While Driving
Another way in which legislatures should toughen the punishment for
texting while driving offenders is by imposing driver’s license suspensions
comparable to those in drunk driving cases.
States regularly suspend the driver’s licenses of drunk drivers, even those
convicted of a first offense.173 Typically, license suspensions are mandatory174 and
last anywhere from a few months to a year.175 There are ways for judges to soften
the blow, such as allowing offenders to drive to work, 176 or for other hardships
such as medical problems.177 The key point, however, is that across the country it
is an accepted practice for judges to suspend the driver’s license of convicted
drunk drivers. Indeed, drivers may still lose their licenses if they refuse to submit
to a breathalyzer test before criminal charges are ever filed, and even if defendants
are eventually acquitted.178
At present, states typically do not suspend driver’s licenses for texting
while driving offenses unless the driver is a serial offender or has committed other
violations. For instance, in June 2011, Nevada enacted a ban on texting while
173.
See Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety & Highway Loss Data Inst., DUI/DWI
Laws, HIGHWAY SAFETY RES. & COMM. (July 2012), http://www.iihs.org/laws/dui.aspx
(“License suspension or revocation traditionally follows conviction for alcohol-impaired
driving.”).
174.
See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a) (2012) (“The department shall
immediately suspend or revoke the privilege of a person to operate a motor vehicle upon the
receipt of an abstract of the record of a court showing that the person has been convicted of
a violation of [certain drunk driving offenses].”).
175.
See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352(a)(1) (specifying six-month suspension);
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP., § 16-205.1 (2012) (forty-five days for first-offenders); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 60-6,197.03 (2012) (six-month suspension which can be shortened if judge allows
the installation of an interlock device instead); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-403(a)(1)(A)(i)
(2012) (one-year suspension for first offenders).
176.
See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352.5(a)(4)(c) (authorizing restricted driver’s
licenses to drive to and from employment).
177.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.410 (2012) (allowing hardship
reductions for medical and other reasons); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:415.1 (2012) (allowing
hardship reductions for medical and family reasons); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-11-30 (2012)
(allowing hardship reductions for first offenders).
178.
See Jennifer E. Dayok, Comment, Administrative Driver’s License
Suspension: A Remedial Tool That Is Not in Jeopardy, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1151, 1154 n.9
(1996) (listing roughly 40 states that have adopted this rule). For a more recent compilation,
see Administrative License Revocation, MADD, http://www.madd.org/laws/administrativelicense-revocation.html (last visited August 16, 2012) (listing 42 states and the District of
Columbia that revoke licenses when drivers refuse to take chemical tests). The Insurance
Institute for Highway Safety and the Highway Loss Data Institute have gathered the
suspension time period for every state that administratively suspends licenses. Ins. Inst. for
Highway Safety & Highway Loss Data Inst., supra note 173. Three months appears to be
the most common suspension period, although some states go as high as a year while a few
states do not impose administrative suspensions. Id.
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driving and provided for license suspension only after a third conviction.179 When
Massachusetts enacted its ban on texting while driving in 2010, it did not classify
it as a moving violation, thus eliminating the possibility of insurance surcharges.180
Even Utah, which seemingly has the toughest texting-while-driving laws in the
nation, and is one of the few places to even authorize license suspensions,181 is
more lenient on texting suspensions than drunk driving suspensions. Judges in
Utah are statutorily required to suspend the licenses of convicted drunk drivers,182
but they have discretion whether to suspend the licenses of those convicted of
texting while driving.183
In the drunk driving context, scholars have observed that license
suspension may be the most feared penalty because it amounts to a considerable
liberty restriction.184 Given that more than one-third of teenagers in the U.S. text
while driving, and that these young drivers undoubtedly value the newfound
freedom of driving on their own,185 imposing the threat of license suspensions may
be beneficial to general deterrence.186 Moreover, assuming texting-while-driving
offenders comply,187 license suspensions should have an incapacitation effect by
179.
See Nevada Bans Texting While Driving, METRO MAG. (June 20, 2011),
http://www.metro-magazine.com/News/Story/2011/06/Nevada-bans-texting-while-driving
.aspx.
180.
See Michael Levenson, New State Law Spells It Out: No Texting While
Driving, BOS. GLOBE (July 3, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
articles/2010/07/03/new_state_law_spells_it_out_no_texting_behind_wheel/.
181.
See Richtel, supra note 158 (discussing how “Utah is much tougher” than the
rest of the nation in punishing texting while driving); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-1715
(2012) (providing that a judge may order the revocation of a convicted person’s license if
the violation caused or resulted in another’s death).
182.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-509(1)(a) (2012) (providing that the driver’s
license division shall “suspend for a period of 120 days the operator’s license of a person
convicted for the first [DUI offense]”).
183.
See id. § 53-3-218(5) (“Upon a conviction for a violation of the prohibition
on using a handheld wireless communication device for text messaging or electronic mail
communication while operating a moving motor vehicle under Section 41-6a-1716, a judge
may order a suspension of the convicted person’s license for a period of three months.”).
184.
See H. Laurence Ross, Can Mandatory Jail Laws Deter Drunk Driving? The
Arizona Case, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 164 (1990) (reporting that according to
defense attorneys who were surveyed, “the punishment most threatening to their clients was
not jail, but license suspension”); H. Laurence Ross, Law, Science, and Accidents: The
British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 68 (1973) (same).
185.
See Steven Cole Smith, Report: Teen Drivers Text, Call on Road, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009, at A26.
186.
Unlike fines, which can be paid by parents, license suspensions can only be
served by teenage drivers themselves.
187.
The problem with license suspensions is that it is difficult to monitor
compliance, leading offenders to ignore the suspension and continue driving. See David J.
DeYoung et al., Estimating the Exposure and Fatal Crash Rates of Suspended/Revoked and
Unlicensed Drivers in California, 29 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 17, 22 (1997)
(noting that most suspended or revoked drivers continue to drive anyway and finding that
8.8% of the drivers on the road in California during a sampled period had suspended or
revoked licenses).
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removing dangerous drivers from the road, at least while the suspension is in
effect.
C. Legislatures Should Require Convicted Offenders to Install Devices in Their
Vehicles That Disable Cell Phones from Texting While the Vehicle Is in
Motion
Yet another way that drunk driving is punished more harshly than texting
while driving is that some drunk drivers are required to install alcohol ignition
interlocks on their vehicles. Although similar devices exist to stop texting while
driving, no state statutorily authorizes them and the Author is unaware of a judge
ever mandating installation following a texting-while-driving conviction. As
explained below, interlocks are an effective way to deal with both drunk driving
and texting-while-driving offenders.
Most states require at least some convicted drunk drivers to install
ignition interlock devices that prevent the offender’s vehicle from starting when
his breath alcohol exceeds a certain level. 188 For many years, ignition interlocks
were not used with great frequency and were typically reserved for offenders
caught with very high blood-alcohol levels or who had numerous prior drunkdriving convictions.189 Recently, however, a few states have begun to make much
greater use of interlock devices and have mandated them after a defendant’s first
drunk-driving offense.190 For instance, in 2010, New York began requiring anyone
sentenced for a drunk-driving offense to pay for the installation of an interlock
device for six months in any vehicle she operates.191 Although the alcohol industry
disputes the effectiveness of interlocks,192 preliminary research indicates that they
substantially reduce recidivism by convicted drunk drivers.193

188.
See Janet Dewey-Kollen & Angela Downes, Shattering Misconceptions
About First-Time Drunk Driving Offenders, 42 PROSECUTOR 14, 16 (2008) (explaining that
45 states and the District of Columbia authorize interlock devices in some circumstances).
189.
For example, in Wisconsin, interlock devices are required for offenders
convicted of second or subsequent drunk driving charges, first-offenders with a blood
alcohol level of .15 or higher, or offenders who improperly refused to take the breathalyzer
test. See WIS. STAT. § 343.301(1g)(b) (2012).
190.
See Dewey-Kollen & Downes, supra note 188, at 16 (noting that, as of 2008,
Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana, and New Mexico required ignition interlocks by all first-time
DWI offenders); Joseph Marutollo, Comment, No Second Chances: Leandra’s Law and
Mandatory Alcohol Ignition Interlocks for First-Time Drunk Driving Offenders, 30 PACE L.
REV. 1090, 1092–95, 1098 (2010) (discussing the enactment of mandatory interlock laws
for first offenders in New York in 2009 and New Mexico in 2005).
191.
See Barry Kamins, New Criminal Justice Legislation, 82 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 31
(2010).
192.
See Marutollo, supra note 190, at 1093–94.
193.
See id. at 1099 (discussing recidivism research in New Mexico); DeweyKollen & Downes, supra note 188, at 16 (discussing studies finding “a 77 percent decrease
in recidivism among interlocked first offenders in West Virginia” and even higher
reductions in Canada).
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Because of the increased problem of texting while driving, the
marketplace has responded with a number of products similar to ignition
interlocks. These devices stop texting or other cell phone use while a vehicle is in
motion. For instance, the cleverly named Textecution product installs an
application on the phone that disables the texting function when the cell phone is
traveling at more than ten miles per hour.194 The total cost is a one-time fee of
$29.99.195 Another product, tXtBlocker, enables cell phone owners to log into an
account and control what times and locations the phone can receive text messages
and phone calls.196 The total cost is $6.99 per month.197 In March 2011, Sprint
announced that it would begin offering a $2-per-month service to its customers
that locks the cell phone screen and blocks text messages while the vehicle is in
motion.198
The natural objection to such devices—just like the objection to alcohol
ignition interlocks—is that individuals will find a way to circumvent them.199 In a
world of evolving technology, this objection certainly has some merit, but the
marketplace has already taken steps to limit the problem. For instance, if a techsavvy teenager figures out how to remove Textecution from the phone, the parent
who purchased the application will be notified by e-mail that it has been
uninstalled.200
At present, parents seeking to protect their children and corporations
seeking to avoid liability for accidents caused by their agents are the primary
customers using devices to stop texting while driving.201 The average adult—who

194.
Frequently Asked Questions, TEXTECUTION, http://www.textecution.com/
faqs.php (last visited July 4, 2012).
195.
Id.
196.
See TXTBLOCKER, http://www.txtblocker.com/default.aspx (last visited July
4, 2012).
197.
See Pricing, tXTBLOCKER, http://www.txtblocker.com/pricing.aspx (last
visited July 4, 2012).
198.
See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Phone Carriers Tout Tool to Stop Texting
and Driving, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Mar. 24, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/
03/24/phone-carriers-tout-tool-to-stop-texting-and-driving/.
199.
Critics complain that drunk driving offenders can have someone else blow
into the ignition interlock or find some other clever way to defeat the device. See Marutollo,
supra note 190, at 1107 (recounting how a recidivist drunk driver used a balloon, an air
compressor, and a cigarette lighter to overcome the interlock).
200.
Frequently Asked Questions, TEXTECUTION, supra note 194.
201.
The product marketing is clearly directed to parents and employers. See, e.g.,
About, TXTBLOCKER, http://www.txtblocker.com/about.aspx (last visited July 30, 2012)
(“With tXtBlocker, you can ensure safe driving for your whole family . . . . Many job
related accidents are now attributed to mobile phone distractions. If you have invested in
phones for your company and employ drivers in your business, have employees that travel
frequently for work, or drive to and from the office every day, you can provide a safer
workplace by using tXtBlocker.”); E-mail from Joe Lemire, employee of Textecution, to
Brian Wittpenn, research assistant for Author (July 28, 2011, 7:18 AM) (on file with author)
(“[T]he majority of [our customers] are parents placing [the application] on a teen[’]s
phone. . . . Several clients had fleets of trucks and wanted to keep their drivers safe.”).
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almost certainly believes he is a good driver, even if he is not202—will not pay to
limit his own ability to utilize his cell phone while driving. However, there is no
reason why states cannot require offenders convicted of texting while driving to
use such devices, just as most states require drivers convicted of driving drunk to
use alcohol ignition interlock devices. 203
The hardships of requiring convicted offenders to install the text-blocking
device are far less than for alcohol ignition interlock devices. First, devices to stop
texting while driving are far cheaper and thus less financially burdensome on
poorer offenders. While an alcohol ignition interlock costs about $70 per month
plus the cost of installation and removal (a total of at least $500 for a six-month
period),204 devices to stop texting while driving may cost as little as $24 per year 205
and future technology may soon reduce that cost to almost nothing. Second, unlike
alcohol interlocks, text-blocking devices are not stigmatic to the offender because
they are hidden inside the vehicle or are non-tangible applications on the phone
themselves.
If states are willing to require alcohol ignition interlocks that are
embarrassing and cost offenders more than $500 for a six-month period to reduce
the dangers of recidivist drunk driving, then there is good reason to implement far
cheaper, invisible devices that reduce the equally dangerous activity of texting
while driving. This approach would seem to be a palatable first step in dealing
with the texting-while-driving problem. To date, such legislation has only been
proposed in Rhode Island,206 where it was shelved for further study after a single
committee hearing.207 States seeking to deter texting while driving and to
incapacitate offenders should specifically authorize, and perhaps require, the
installation of interlock devices to prevent texting while driving.

202.
Nowhere is the Lake Wobegon effect, where everyone believes they are
above average, more present than in people’s perceptions of their own driving. See, e.g.,
Mark S. Horswill et al., Drivers’ Ratings of Different Components of Their Own Driving
Skill: A Greater Illusion of Superiority for Skills That Relate to Accident Involvement, 34 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 177–78 (2004).
203.
Indeed, Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood has asked automakers to
design devices that would disable Twitter and Facebook while vehicles are moving. Angela
Greiling Keane, Don’t Tweet and Drive: Feds Ask Automakers to Disable Devices in
Moving Cars, DENVER POST (Feb. 17, 2012, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/
business/ci_19984202.
204.
See, e.g., What to Expect, LIFESAFER, http://www.lifesafer.com/what-toexpect (last visited August 16, 2012).
205.
See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 198 and accompanying text.
206.
See David Klepper, R.I. Lawmaker: Device Can Stop Texting While Driving,
ASSOC. PRESS (Apr. 5, 2011, 8:17 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/
D9MDGGJG0.htm.
207.
E-mail from Representative Charlene Lima, Rhode Island House of
Representatives, to Adam Gershowitz, Author (June 9, 2011, 12:37 PM) (on file with
author).
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D. Exchanging Confessions for Searches
As I advocated in Parts IV.A–C, legislatures should impose tougher fines,
jail time, license suspension, and interlock devices on texting while driving
offenders to enhance general deterrence and incapacitation. Yet, these approaches
focus exclusively on what happens after a defendant is convicted, rather than
enhancing the odds of convicting those who commit the crime of texting while
driving. Also, imposing tougher punishments on convicted offenders does not
reduce police authority to rummage through reams of private cell phone data in the
name of investigating allegations of texting while driving. Legislatures can achieve
these seemingly inconsistent goals, increasing the chances of conviction and
reducing the instances of warrantless cell phone searches, by adopting a statutory
scheme in which drivers are given the option to avoid a cell phone search in
exchange for a written confession that they were texting while driving. As outlined
below, this approach would make it faster and easier to convict offenders because
it is hard for defendants to contest their guilt in the face of a written confession. At
the same time, exchanging a confession for a search would statutorily eliminate an
officer’s authority to search, thus providing greater protection against warrantless
cell phone searches than that provided by the U.S. Constitution. As explained
below, exchanging a confession for a search does not amount to unconstitutional
coercion and is sound public policy.
Legislatures should codify the exact steps that law enforcement officers
must take when exchanging a confession for a search. Statutes should specify that
police may only search a driver’s cell phone if the driver has been given a clear
opportunity to confess and has declined to do so. The statute should specify the
exact language that the officer must convey to the driver and it should provide an
opportunity for the driver to sign a clear confession or denial. A simple
formulation would be as follows:
Confessing in Lieu of a Search

1.

Each driver stopped for texting while driving shall be orally
advised of the following rights and choices and shall be
presented with a copy of this form.

A. You have been stopped by a police officer for
unlawfully texting while driving.
B. If you choose to confess to texting while driving, the
officer will not be allowed to search your cell phone. By
confessing, you will be issued a ticket and will be
allowed to leave immediately after the paperwork is
completed.
C. You have a constitutional right not to confess to the
texting-while-driving allegation. You are free to deny
the allegation and to refuse to confess.
D. If you refuse to sign this confession, then the officer will
be permitted by law to search your cell phone for
evidence that you were texting while driving.
2.

I acknowledge that I have read and understood paragraphs
1A through 1D above. [Signed__________________]
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Driver shall sign either Option A or Option B below:
A. I hereby confess to the allegation that I was texting
while driving. [Signed ____________________]
or
B. I hereby deny the allegation that I was texting while
driving. [Signed ____________________]

There are multiple benefits to a statutory scheme that provides for a clear
and simple confession while forbidding a search of the phone. First, and most
obviously, for individuals who wish to protect the privacy of their cell phones, this
scheme gives them protection well in excess of what the Fourth Amendment
affords. Although the search incident to arrest doctrine and the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment would authorize police to search the driver’s
cell phone, the legislature would be giving drivers the option to prevent that
search. The statute thus amounts to a windfall for some defendants who were
clearly guilty of texting while driving and have something to hide in their phones.
Had officers been allowed to search the phone, they might have discovered text
messages revealing that the driver is a drug dealer,208 e-mails showing that the
driver is engaged in theft from his employer, photos of him posing with an illegal
firearm,209 or simply embarrassing (but not illegal) naked pictures of his girlfriend.
A statutory scheme that exchanges a confession for a search allows the driver to
prevent law enforcement from ever seeing any of this incriminating and
embarrassing information.
Second, and related, the statute gives the driver valuable information
about his rights and provides the opportunity to make an informed choice. Drivers
will know, up front, that they have the right refuse to confess. They will also
know, up front, that police have the authority to search the phone without a
warrant. This level of knowledge is atypical in the criminal justice system. For
instance, under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, police need not inform
suspects about their right to refuse consent.210 The decision whether to confess to
texting while driving is thus far more informed than the decision whether to
consent to a search. Additionally, the statutory scheme is considerably simpler—
and thus more helpful—than the supposedly informed choices defendants make
after receiving Miranda warnings.211 Drivers would have a binary choice to either

208.
Cell phone searches regularly turn up this type of evidence. See supra notes
102–03 and accompanying text.
209.
See John Grant Emeigh, Facebook, Texting Help Police Investigations,
MONT. STANDARD (July 24, 2011, 8:26 AM), http://mtstandard.com/news/local/facebooktexting-help-police-investigations/article_32e95608-b601-11e0-a5be-001cc4c002e0.html
(explaining how prosecutors found a photo of a defendant flashing a gang sign and holding
two dozen $100 bills on Facebook).
210.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231–33 (1973).
211.
See George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v.
Arizona: “Embedded” in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 245–53 (2002)
(explaining the ways in which the Miranda rule actually harms defendants and helps
police).
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confess to the simple offense of texting while driving or to refuse to confess. There
would be no ambiguity about whether they were entitled to a lawyer, what they
would have to do to invoke their choice, or whether it would be in their best
interest to confess.212 Under a statute exchanging a confession for a search, the
choice will be simple and understandable for most defendants.
A third, and completely different benefit of this statutory approach is that
a signed confession will make it very difficult for drivers to later argue that they
are not guilty. To be sure, defendants will contend that they signed the confession
because they were scared or because they thought they had no choice, but such
arguments will be unpersuasive. The plain language of the document lays out the
driver’s two options and provides a clear space for the driver to either confess or
refuse to confess. Thus, in most cases where the driver has signed a written
confession, she will know that she has little chance of prevailing at trial.213
Accordingly, defendants will likely plead guilty more often and at an earlier stage
of the process than they otherwise might. This, in turn, will increase the certainty
and speed of conviction for the crime of texting while driving—two key factors in
achieving deterrence.214
Fourth, defendants who refuse to sign the confession will be in no worse
position than if the statute had never been enacted. Under existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, almost all courts would permit officers to search the
cell phone for evidence of texting while driving. A statute that exchanges a
confession for a search does not confer any additional authority on law
enforcement to conduct a warrantless cell phone search. Quite obviously,
legislatures lack the power to convey more search and seizure authority than the
Fourth Amendment permits. As such, if a defendant chooses to assert his rights
and refuses to confess, he will be in exactly the same position as if the statute had
never been enacted. The officer may choose to search the phone under the search
incident to arrest doctrine or automobile exception, or she may choose not to.

212.
All of these confusing problems arise under Miranda. See JOSHUA DRESSLER
& GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE : PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES
669–73, 678–95 (4th ed. 2010).
213.
See Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions
and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 519 (“A
suspect’s confession sets in motion a seemingly irrefutable presumption of guilt among
justice officials, the media, the public, and lay jurors. The system is stacked against the
individual who confesses, treating that suspect more harshly at every stage of the
investigative and trial process.” (footnotes omitted)).
214.
A vast literature demonstrates that the certainty of punishment is the most
important factor in maximizing deterrence. See supra note 20 (collecting sources). Some
studies have also found the speed of punishment to be a relevant factor in deterrence. See,
e.g., H. Laurence Ross, Administrative License Revocation in New Mexico: An Evaluation,
9 LAW & POL’Y 5, 5–6, 14 (1987) (studying new law that immediately suspended the
licenses of drivers who failed or refused alcohol tests and finding that immediate
suspensions—in other words, the variable for swiftness of punishment—appeared to reduce
highway fatalities).
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Of course, there are objections—some weak and some plausible—that
can be raised to this statutory scheme. The first objection is that such an approach
may encourage police to conduct warrantless cell phone searches that they might
not otherwise have done. Critics would surely argue that failure to confess might
give the officer a hunch—whether merited or not—that the driver is hiding
something more serious and thus encourage officers to search phones they would
otherwise have ignored. The objection about refusal to confess leading to
additional cell phone searches has some merit, but it is ultimately not sufficient to
undermine the framework.215
Even though I have advocated that texting while driving should be treated
as a more serious offense carrying jail time and stiff fines, most law enforcement
officers, like the general public, likely do not view it as a very serious offense.
Given that police deal with murders, robberies, burglaries, drug smuggling and
other serious offenses, most officers likely will not be interested in prolonging
texting while driving detentions without good reason. And while refusal to confess
might be slightly suspicious, the officer (as an average person with her own phone
and privacy concerns) likely understands that the driver has a lot of private data on
the phone that he simply may want to keep private. As such, an officer who was
not inclined to search a cell phone before the driver refused to confess is probably
not going to change his mind simply because of the refusal. Refusal to consent will
surely lead to some cell phone searches that otherwise would not have occurred,
but the number will likely be fairly small.
A second, and related objection, is that a driver’s refusal to confess might
be interpreted by police officers as “contempt of cop.” 216 Officers might become
aggravated with the driver and retaliate against him by searching the cell phone
when they otherwise would not have done so. While there is likely some truth to
this objection as well, it must be rejected because otherwise any restriction on
police power could be defeated. Simply because police may dislike individuals
exercising their statutory rights is not a legitimate reason to prevent the creation of
such rights.217

215.
See Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply:
Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483,
1487–89 (2007) (explaining that the consequences of refusing consent should be “extremely
limited” but that police “plainly view a failure to comply as suspicious, and treat resistance
to an attempt to initiate a consensual encounter as sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion”).
216.
See Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal
Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1451 n.50 (2009) (explaining that “contempt of cop” is a way in
which officers “punish or exact retribution on disrespectful or non-submissive individuals”).
217.
The Supreme Court did assert a perverse version of this argument, however,
in Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Justice Rehnquist argued in passing for a low
probable cause standard because making it onerous to get a warrant would result in police
simply conducting warrantless searches. See id. at 236 (“If the affidavits submitted by
police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate,
police might well resort to warrantless searches . . . .”). The contempt of cop argument is
thus not without precedent, even if it is unpersuasive.
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A third objection is that asking a driver to confess to texting while driving
in order to avoid an invasive and potentially embarrassing search of her cell phone
is unduly coercive and thus unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. In
essence, the argument is that an exchange creates so much pressure on the driver to
sign the confession that it renders it involuntary and thus unconstitutional. On an
instinctual level, there appears to be some merit to this argument. Drivers who
might have a viable defense to the texting-while-driving charge might nevertheless
sign the confession because they fear handing their phone over to the police.
Drivers who want to protect their privacy or just have the traffic stop end quickly
might feel as though they have no choice but to sign the confession. Whatever the
instinctual allure of this argument, however, as a legal matter, it is quite weak.218
To render a confession involuntary in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
police must overbear the will of the suspect.219 This occurs when law enforcement
uses force, threat of force, or, in rare cases, an extreme form of psychological
trickery.220 Quite obviously, the first and second scenarios are extremely unlikely
in the vast majority of cases, leaving the inquiry to ride on whether the police are
engaged in extreme trickery. The answer to this question must surely be no.
Simply making a suspect uncomfortable or delaying her ability to leave the scene
does not come close to qualifying as coercion.
Involuntariness is judged under a totality of the circumstances test and
there are no specific factors pointing toward coercion in a scheme that exchanges a
confession for a search.221 Police who follow the statutory script will have been
honest and straightforward with the suspect about his options. They will have
advised him in plain language of his right to refuse to confess, a crucial factor in
determining that the confession was voluntary. 222 In short, while a suspect might
not enjoy being put in a situation that forces him to choose between confession and
a possible search of her phone, there is nothing unconstitutionally coercive about
that choice. By the statute’s very language, the suspect has a choice and is thus not
coerced.
The key reason why the coercion argument fails is that the officer almost
certainly has Fourth Amendment authority under the search incident to arrest

218.
The Supreme Court has rejected far more compelling instances where
defendants might have felt trapped and helpless. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,
437–40 (1991) (declining to find a seizure when officers worked the busses and asked for
consent to search passengers’ bags in a confined area).
219.
See Arizona v. Fuliminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287–88 (1991).
220.
For a study about thousands of confession cases explaining the parameters of
the voluntariness rule, see Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the
Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601 (2006).
221.
See id. at 638 n.210.
222.
Courts explicitly and implicitly find that police compliance with the Miranda
warnings is a reason to conclude a confession has been voluntary. See id. at 637 (“Many
cases can be found throughout the nation—both federal and state—in which confessions are
held to be voluntary, with courts relying strongly on the fact that the suspects were given
Miranda warnings and appeared to understand their constitutional rights.”).
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doctrine and the automobile exception to conduct the search.223 In other words, the
officer is not gathering evidence through deception that he was not legally entitled
to acquire.
The choice between a confession and a search is very different from the
choice faced by the defendant in Bumper v. North Carolina, the famous Supreme
Court case where police lied about having a search warrant to gain consent to
search a house.224 In Bumper, Justice Stewart uttered the much quoted statement
that “[w]here there is coercion there cannot be consent.”225 The Court simply
meant that police may not lie about the existence of a warrant when they do not
have one. If police have the ability to get a warrant, then threatening to get one if
the suspect does not consent is a perfectly constitutional police tactic. 226 As the
First Circuit has explained “[c]ourts have held, with a regularity bordering on the
monotonous, that [threatening to get a warrant if the suspect refuses consent],
made in a case in which the facts were sufficient to support the issuance of a
search warrant, does not constitute coercion.”227 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has
explained that an officer telling a suspect that he will get a warrant if consent is
withheld can only possibly be coercive if the statement is made in a threatening
manner, and even that argument is significantly diminished if probable cause to
procure a warrant in fact exists.228
Courts have applied the same logic in other contexts as well. For instance,
in a case where officers procured consent to search by threatening to bring in a
drug-sniffing dog (which they had reasonable suspicion to do under the
circumstances), the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that consent
was invalid.229
Although the cases described above all involve consent, the key issue is
whether consent was voluntarily given. And the voluntariness issue in consent
cases is indistinguishable from the voluntariness question that arises in the Fifth
Amendment confession context. Accordingly, it appears well settled that police
can “threaten” to search a cell phone if the driver refuses to confess to texting
while driving.

223.
See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE : A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 74 (4th ed. 2004) (explaining that when a police threat “accurately informs the
individual of his precise legal situation” then it “does not involve any deceit or trickery” and
does not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation).
224.
391 U.S. 543, 546–47 (1968).
225.
Id. at 550.
226.
See Rebecca Strauss, Note, We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way:
The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 870–71 (2002)
(noting the state of the law but arguing for a different rule); see also LAFAVE, supra note
223, at 74 & n.110 (collecting cases).
227.
United States v. Lee, 317 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2003).
228.
United States v. Rodriguez, 464 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006).
229.
United States v. Todhunter, 297 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Despite the clear constitutionality of a rule that exchanges a confession
for a search, legislatures have not embraced it.230 Indeed, legislatures almost never
adopt rules that enable suspects to avoid an uncomfortable police tactic by
submitting to a different tactic.231 Rather, legislative approaches to criminal
procedure are usually at two diametrically opposite extremes. Legislators either
give police blanket authority to utilize certain techniques or they take a police
tactic off the table entirely. For example, legislatures give police blanket authority
to deceive suspects during interrogations, rather than permitting it in some types of
cases but not others.232 On the opposite side of the coin, many legislatures have
completely banned the (debatably effective) practice of racial profiling, rather than
allowing it in particular kinds of cases. 233 In other words, legislatures tend to think
one-dimensionally and say, “yes, police can do that,” or “no, police cannot do
that,” rather than adopting rules that say “police can use a tactic in these situations
but not those.”
The lack of such legislative nuance in criminal investigation rules is not
surprising. As Bill Stuntz has explained, police interests are typically aligned with
legislators’ interests, making legislators inclined to give the police the tools they
want.234 In rare circumstances however, legislatures truncate police authority either
out of sincere belief,235 self-interest,236 or to score political points.237 For these
230.
Perhaps because of their absence from legislation, scholars rarely advocate
such alternative choices. For one prominent exception, see William J. Stuntz, Local
Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2189–90 (2002) (advocating, among other
proposals, that Miranda rules be relaxed in certain cases in exchange for law enforcement
videotaping interrogations). As Professor Stuntz recognized, most of his suggested changes
to police authority would require the Supreme Court to alter its rules, thus making them less
likely to occur. Id. at 2191–92.
231.
Although on a bigger picture level, legislative and constitutional choices do
redirect police activity. For instance, as Jacqueline Ross has explained, limits imposed on
police questioning have resulted in increased police deception and undercover tactics. See
Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1501, 1508–09 (2002). In Europe, legislatures do circumscribe certain
police techniques, such as reserving undercover policing for certain categories of crime. See
id. at 1521. There are very few comparable examples in the American criminal justice
system.
232.
See Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for
Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
791, 834–40 (2006) (advocating that legislatures change the status quo and ban deceptive
police tactics).
233.
See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 & nn.1–4 (2002).
234.
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 534 (2001) (explaining in the criminal law context that “[a]dvancing police
and prosecutors’ goals usually means advancing legislators’ goals as well”).
235.
For example, many politicians came to the conclusion, at least before
September 11, 2001, that racial profiling was wrong even if it was arguably helpful to law
enforcement. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 233, at 1430 & n.66.
236.
See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why
Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 601–05,
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reasons, and because it is simply easier to ban a practice than to draft legislation
authorizing it in particularized circumstances, legislators occasionally reject
certain law enforcement tools, yet rarely draft rules that limit law enforcement in
some situations but not others.
That is not to say that my proposal to exchange a confession for a search
is completely without analogy. There are somewhat similar exchange rules in other
spheres of the criminal justice system that give suspects choices that in turn restrict
the government’s power. For instance, when a driver is pulled over for drunk
driving, the officer will give him a choice to either take a breathalyzer test on the
one hand or to administratively lose his license238 and possibly have the jury hear
of his refusal on the other hand.239 Another example is the statutorily authorized
fast-track plea-bargaining process in which Congress has given defendants an
initial choice. Defendants can agree to plead guilty prior to indictment and to
waive certain discovery, and in exchange, they receive a charge bargain or a more
lenient sentence.240 The government gives up its ability to get a tougher sentence in
exchange for a swifter outcome.
Giving the defendant the option of exchanging a confession for a search
goes even further than the breath test and fast-track plea-bargaining examples.
Exchanging a confession for a search cuts off a perfectly constitutional police
tactic to further competing goals of the criminal justice system: swift conviction
and individual privacy.

CONCLUSION
Although legislatures have moved quickly over the last few years to
criminalize texting while driving, they have not appreciated the scope or severity
of the problem, nor have they considered the possibility of police searching cell
660, 662 (arguing that many pro-defendant rules result from legislatures being placed in the
crosshairs of the criminal justice system).
237.
Legislatures in some libertarian states—Texas is a good example—have
refused to support sobriety checkpoints in large part because they are unpopular. See Adam
M. Gershowitz, Is Texas Tough on Crime, but Soft on Criminal Procedure?, 49 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 31 (forthcoming Winter 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1805208 (describing how the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has required
legislative authorization for sobriety checkpoints and how the Texas legislature has refused
to do so).
238.
See Dayok, supra note 178, at 1153 nn.9–10 (cataloging states that have
adopted this rule).
239.
See James P. Geraghty, The Reality of Homicide and DUI Charges: Knowing
When to Settle and When to Defend, in DEFENDING DUI VEHICULAR HOMICIDE CASES 41, 43
(2009) (“[I]n many states the prosecutor can tell the jury your client refused a Breathalyzer
test.”).
240.
For a description of the practice and its problems, see Jane L. McClellan &
Jon M. Sands, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Policy Paradox of Early Disposition
Programs: A Primer on “Fast-Track” Sentences, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 517, 517–19, 527, 533–
34 (2006); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629–33 (2002) (approving the
practice in the discovery context).
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phones. In their haste to act, many legislatures have adopted statutes that are either
hopelessly vague or under-inclusive and fail to cover dangerous cell phone
activity, such as viewing Facebook, or using applications, such as Urban Spoon or
Words With Friends. In setting punishments, legislatures have also failed to
analogize texting while driving to the comparable behavior of drunk driving. Fines
for texting while driving are far too lenient and, unlike drunk driving cases, most
defendants face no risk of jail time, license suspension, or interlock devices. At the
same time that legislatures have enacted toothless statutes, they have unwittingly
encouraged warrantless cell phone searches under the Fourth Amendment’s search
incident to arrest doctrine and automobile exception. In many states, officers who
suspect drivers of texting while driving can search the full contents of their cell
phones without a warrant and, in some cases, without even having probable cause.
Legislatures can get tough on texting while driving without also
permitting warrantless cell phone searches. In addition to enacting tougher
penalties for texting while driving and mandating interlock devices, legislatures
should also adopt a strategy that is almost unheard of in the criminal procedure
field. Rather than a binary choice of allowing or completely disallowing a lawenforcement tactic, legislatures should adopt a more nuanced approach that makes
police authority dependent on the choice of the suspect. Legislatures should give
the suspect the option to confess to the texting allegation and extinguish the
officer’s ability to conduct a warrantless search of the phone. Exchanging a
confession for a search will improve deterrence (because it is hard for drivers to
dispute their own confessions) while reducing warrantless cell phone searches.
This nuanced solution enhances the certainty of conviction while recognizing a
greater expectation of privacy in cell phones than the Fourth Amendment provides.

